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In this thesis, we examine the bribery risk exposure of the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund Global (GPFG) and analyze whether the pensions fund historically benefitted from being 
invested in companies with elevated bribery risk. Through a comparative study, we first 
contrast the bribery risk exposure of the countries in which the Oil Fund is invested with that 
of a peer group of three other sovereign wealth funds. Afterward, we examine whether the 
bribery risk of the investees’ countries is an accurate indicator of the actual bribery risk of the 
firms. For this purpose, we develop an indicator, the Firm Bribery Risk Indicator (FBRI), which 
estimates corruption risk at the firm level by identifying red flags that signal risk of illicit 
behavior. The relation of this measure, approximating the actual bribery risk of a firm, to the 
country-level risk is analyzed. Finally, by applying a Fama-French five-factor model, we 
evaluate whether the fund historically benefited from being invested in companies that we 
previously identified to inhere an elevated bribery risk. 
Our results show that the GPFG’s relative number of equities and share of total assets invested 
in firms from high-risk countries exceeds those of its peers. However, we further find that the 
bribery risk of the country is an insufficient estimator of actual bribery risk. Thus, our findings 
suggest that a more detailed analysis of the bribery risk of the funds’ investments is required 
to make a valid statement about the overall bribery exposure of each fund. Simply comparing 
the country-level bribery risk does not allow to derive meaningful insights but only grants a 
first, surficial impression.  
Additionally, we examine the relation between country-level risk and the different risk 
determinants considered by the FBRI. We find that on average, firms listed in countries with 
high bribery risk scores are more often state-owned, have slightly less effective anti-corruption 
systems in place, and have subsidiaries in more risky countries. However, our findings do not 
suggest systematic differences in operating industries, political proximity, and the existence of 
previous bribery allegations of firms in respect to their country’s bribery risk. 
Our financial performance analysis revealed that the Oil Fund financially benefitted from being 
invested in firms with high corruption risk. However, we could not establish significant 
differences between the high- and low-risk portfolios’ abnormal returns. 
Keywords: Government Pension Fund Global, corruption, bribery, red flags, TRACE Matrix, 
sovereign wealth funds, Fama-French multi-factor model, financial returns 
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State-owned investment funds attracted growing attention in recent years as they gained 
relevance as solvent long-term share- and debtholders on the financial markets. Especially 
countries with large reserves of natural resources have become significant investors in the 
global economy, as spiking oil prices brought significant revenues to several sovereign wealth 
funds’ (SWFs) home countries (Bahoo et al. 2020:1). Simultaneously, environmental, social, 
and governance (ESG) integration in investment practices ascended prioritization for SWFs as 
it did for the whole finance industry (Friede et al. 2015:211). SWFs are particularly stimulated 
to adequately account for ESG issues since their ultimate owners are the country’s people. 
Therefore, the full scope of society’s interests besides financial ones needs to be addressed by 
a pension fund. Societally harmful conduct of firms like corruption should not be fueled by 
SWFs allocating capital to such entities. That being said, contemporary views on SWFs are 
mixed. They received criticisms for their poor governance, lack of disclosure, and transparency 
(Shih 2009:330), as well as regarding their political influence (Kratsas & Truby 2015:97) and 
investment strategies (Kamiński 2017:734). 
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) is the focal point of this thesis. 
With ownership of 1.4 percent of all the world’s listed equities, Norway’s Oil Fund is the 
largest sovereign wealth fund in the world and has significant economic power (The Economist 
2017). Contrary to the abovementioned opinions, the GPFG is frequently considered the most 
transparent of all SWFs (Bahoo et al. 2020:1). Moreover, it consistently scored the highest in 
the SWF scoreboards developed by Bagnall and Truman (2013), which assesses the 
governance, accountability, and transparency of a total of 58 funds around the world.  
Even though SWFs were scrutinized from several perspectives in recent years, little research 
was conducted addressing aspects of corruption in the funds. Some studies included corruption 
discussions in general assessments of SWF’s governance performance (Aizenman & Glick 
2009), while others focused on the relation of corruption level of the fund managing country 
and financial return (Zhang et al. 2018). However, to the best of our knowledge, a detailed 
analysis of corruption exposure in a SWF portfolio has not yet been conducted. 
The obstructive consequences of corruption on society are widely recognized. Corruption 
hinders economic development and discourages foreign direct investment, distorts judicial 
systems, weakens competition, and subsidizes criminal activity (OECD 2011:3). The fact that 
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most funds operate highly diversified portfolios makes them vulnerable to corruption in 
numerous business sectors in different countries across several continents. The GPFG is no 
exception, as some of its equities have been recently associated with gross corruption scandals, 
involving the German multinational conglomerate ThyssenKrupp AG (in 2021) and the 
Brazilian oil and gas company Petrobras (in 2019). These cases attracted massive media 
coverage and directed attention to the responsible investment strategy of the GPFG. Therefore, 
we decided to examine the bribery risk of the whole portfolio in further detail. In this thesis, 
we evaluate whether the fund’s eminent disclosure practices described by scholars are also 
reflected in its exposure to corruption. 
1.2 Research objective 
The main research question of this thesis is formulated as follows: 
What is the extent of bribery risk in the GPFG’s portfolio, and did the fund benefit historically 
from being invested in companies with high bribery risk? 
For our research, the concept of bribery risk is crucial. When referring to bribery risk 
throughout this thesis, we distinguish three layers of risk that base on a concept described by 
Kenny and Søreide (2009:11): country-, industry-, and firm-level bribery risk. We define the 
country-level bribery risk as the risk arising from factors in respect to the legal and cultural 
environment, which affect all companies operating in a given country. Industry-level bribery 
risk is caused by determinants that are inherent in the business models of companies in a 
particular industry, such as requirements like operating licenses and other permissions. Firm-
level determinants refer to red flags that are caused by the organization and management 
characteristics of a particular company. 
1.2.1 Hypotheses 
We address our overall research question by splitting it up into three hypotheses. Although 
textually connected, each one is analyzed separately throughout the thesis. Our first hypothesis 
is constructed in order to obtain an overview of the bribery risk exposure inherent in the 
GPFG’s portfolio. Therefore, by focusing solely on the country level bribery risk, the fund is 
compared to a peer group of SWFs. To estimate country-level risk, we rely on the bribery risk 
scores provided by the TRACE Matrix.  
Hypothesis I: The country-specific bribery risk exposure in the GPFG is not systematically 
different than of its peer sovereign wealth funds. 
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The fact that a company is listed in a country where bribery risk is high, does not imply 
involvement in corruption. Companies from low-risk countries also operate in high-risk 
countries and vice versa. Moreover, previous research demonstrates that additional risk 
determinants besides bribery risk of operating countries affect the likelihood of a firm being 
involved in corruption. The question of what the country-level bribery risk can tell us about the 
actual bribery risk exposure of a firm is key for the interpretation of the analysis results under 
Hypothesis I. Thus, our second hypothesis aims to study the relationship between country-level 
bribery risk and the actual bribery risk of a company.  
Hypothesis II: Within the GPFG’s portfolio, firms from countries with high bribery risk are 
subject to high bribery risk at the firm level. 
For testing this hypothesis, we estimate the firm-specific bribery risk with an indicator that 
comprises several risk determinants, the Firm Bribery Risk Indicator (FBRI). Moreover, the 
relationship between country-level bribery risk and particular risk determinants like political 
proximity or public ownership is examined. 
The third hypothesis is formulated to evaluate whether firms with high bribery risk have 
positively contributed to the financial performance of the GPFG. Therefore, the abnormal 
returns of equities from the GPFG with high bribery risk exposure, indicated by a high FBRI 
score, are compared to those with modest bribery risk, indicated by a low FBRI score. We 
hypothesize that firms with high bribery risk have higher risk-adjusted returns. 
Hypothesis III: Within the GPFG’s portfolio, equities with high FBRI scores have higher 
abnormal returns than equities with low FBRI scores. 
1.2.2 Scope and purpose 
This thesis is written in collaboration with TRACE International, a non-profit organization 
based in the United States, that provides anti-bribery compliance support to multinational 
companies. The objective of this cooperation is to investigate to what extent the portfolio of 
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) is subject to corruption risk. The 
2019 edition of the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix (TRACE Matrix) is used as the primary source 
for the corruption risk analysis. By collecting and aggregating a wide range of recognized 
cross-country data on the perceived extent of corruption, combined with other measures for 
bureaucracy and transparency, it eases the study of bribery risk at the country level (TRACE 
2019b:2). Consequently, our research focuses solely on bribery risk when investigating the 
extent of corruption risk exposure in the GPFG. Following the description of TRACE, we 
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define bribery risk exposure as the “possibility that bribe payments to government and other 
authorities’ official(s) are paid to achieve an illicit competitive advantage” (TRACE 2019b:1). 
The portfolio of the GPFG comprises equities, fixed income investments, and unlisted real 
estates. To limit the scope of our research and ensure comparability with other funds, this thesis 
considers only equity investments. Thus, the term “investment(s)” is used to describe equity 
investment(s). 
With our thesis, we aim to contribute to both the existing literature of sovereign wealth funds 
and the field of corruption research. In the first part of our analysis, we assess and compare the 
corruption risk exposure across funds from different countries. Afterward, with the 
development of the FBRI, we propose a standardized approach for estimating the potential risk 
of bribery involvement for a firm. Finally, we evaluate the risk-adjusted returns of a subset of 
companies that we found to be at high exposure of bribery risk. 
1.3 Structure 
Having presented the background for our study, the next chapter considers the concept of SWFs 
in general and the responsible investment strategy of the GPFG in particular. Chapter 3 
discusses the theory about corruption risk determinants at the country, industry, and firm levels. 
The identified indicators constitute the basis for our further analyses. Chapter 4 covers the 
empirical methodology of our study, the indicator we developed to estimate bribery exposure, 
and the statistical methods applied to evaluate our hypotheses. Chapter 5 describes the data 
collection, which is required for the empirical analysis elaborated in Chapter 6. The results are 
discussed in Chapter 7, while concluding remarks and suggestions for further research are 
outlined in Chapter 8. 
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2 Role and governance of the Government Pension Fund Global 
2.1 Sovereign wealth funds 
The term sovereign wealth fund was first used by Rozanov (2005:1) in his work “Who Holds 
the Wealth of Nations?” (Bahoo et al. 2020:1). Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are state-owned 
investment vehicles that invest internationally in various types of assets ranging from financial 
to real assets (Alhashel 2015:2). Based on the taxonomy of the International Monetary Fund, 
SWFs can be divided into five groups: (1) stabilization funds, (2) savings funds, (3) 
development funds, (4) reserve investment corporations, and (5) pension reserve funds (Al-
Hassan et al. 2013:4). Since pension reserves are included to some degree in almost all SWFs, 
the terms SWF and pension fund are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. As of March 
2021, 95 SWFs around the world are invested with a total of $8.07 trillion assets under 
management (AUM) (SWFI 2021). Thereof, the largest pension fund in terms of AUM is the 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), followed by China Investment 
Corporation and Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio. 
2.2 The Government Pension Fund of Norway 
Norway’s Oil Fund was established by the Norwegian Parliament in 1990 with the purpose of 
investing the earnings produced by the petroleum industry. In a video published on the Norges 
Bank Investment Management (NBIM) website, Norway’s previous prime minister, Jens 
Stoltenberg describes the primary purposes of the GPFG. Stoltenberg emphasizes that by 
pursuing a long-term savings plan, both current and future generations benefit from the oil 
wealth. In addition, he points out that the fund serves as a financial instrument for stabilizing 
the economy, equipping the Norwegian government with the ability to avoid overheating and 
inflation while providing tools to stimulate the economy in times of recession. The fund’s 
governance model (exhibited in Figure 1) establishes a system for control and supervision. 
   
Figure 1: Governance model of the GPFG 
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As democratic representatives of the Norwegian people, the Norwegian Parliament and the 
Ministry of Finance are the principals of the GPFG. Norges Bank is responsible for managing 
the fund, and its Executive Board has delegated the operational management to NBIM, its 
internal portfolio management department. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance set up the 
Council on Ethics (CoE) to perform independent ethical evaluations of the fund’s investees. 
These assessments are based on ethical guidelines determined by the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance (Norges Bank 2020a:25). The fund is the largest single owner in the world’s stock 
markets and broadly invested across 73 countries, 12 business sectors, and 49 currencies. The 
GPFG’s market value amounted to NOK10,914 billion by the end of 2020 of which 72.8% 
were equities, 24.7% fixed income investments, and 2.5% unlisted real estate (Norges Bank 
2020a:6). 
2.2.1 Responsible investment 
The GPFG undertakes responsible investment mainly through two mechanisms: exercising 
ownership rights granted through the securities it controls2 (1) and observation and exclusion 
of companies from its investment portfolio (2) (Halvorssen & Eldredge 2013:395). Active 
engagement is enacted by entering dialogues and discussions as well as demanding information 
beyond public disclosures. These mechanisms can be triggered by either product-based 
exclusion criteria, such as the production of tobacco or certain types of weapons, or conduct-
based exclusion criteria, such as human rights violations and corruption (Council on Ethics 
2019:9). Hence, ESG issues are integrated into risk management and may result in divestment 
of assets assessed to have an elevated, unmitigated long-term risk. As of the 3rd of March 2021, 
a total of 143 companies were excluded from the fund’s portfolio. Most of the divestments 
were subject to the product-based coal criterion, while the fund merely divested from two 
companies3 because of unmitigated gross corruption risk (Figure 2). Although in practice, 
Norges Bank might have withdrawn from investments due to gross corruption without publicly 
announcing it, the number appears relatively low, especially compared to divestments based 
on environmental concerns. 
 
2 These are subsumed by Norges Bank under “active ownership”. 
3 JBS SA in 2018 and ZTE Corp in 2016. 
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Figure 2: Excluded companies grouped by exclusion criteria 
2.2.2 The Council on Ethics’ work under the corruption criterion 
Section 3 of the GPFG’s ethical guidelines states that “Companies may be put under 
observation or be excluded if there is an unacceptable risk that the company contributes to or 
is responsible for gross corruption” (Ministry of Finance 2014:3). Corruption allegations 
against companies in the fund are systematized through portfolio monitoring. Provided there 
are many corruption cases in a specific industry, the CoE considers them collectively and 
investigates the most serious allegations. Such reviews were carried out on specific sets of 
companies from the oil service (2019), health care (2018), construction (2017), 
telecommunication (2016), and defense (2016) sectors.  
When the Council uncovers a corruption case, several conditions must be met before a 
recommendation regarding either observation or exclusion can be sent to Norges Bank. Firstly, 
the CoE must be able to determine that the given company has been involved in gross 
corruption. Furthermore, it must assess the possibility that the firm may again be associated 
with corrupt acts in the future. Provided that both these criteria are met, the Council notifies 
Norges Bank about the detected ethical risk. Apart from exclusion and observation, the 
Executive Board of Norges Bank is equipped with a third tool to mitigate unethical behaviors, 
namely active ownership. This mechanism is utilized when the Board considers dialogue and 
exercising its shareholder rights to be the most suitable way for influencing ESG issues. A 
recent example is the case of the Chinese company PetroChina, whose senior executives were 
accused of accepting bribes in exchange for contracts to suppliers in multiple countries between 
the period 1980-2014 (Council on Ethics 2016:2). Since PetroChina has shown little 
cooperation with the CoE and failed to provide information about internal anti-corruption 
efforts, the Council has proposed divestment in December 2016 (Council on Ethics 2016:13). 
Norges Bank, however, refused to follow the recommendation and placed the company under 
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observation. However, a reiterated evaluation in August 2020 led to the decision to engage in 
PetroChina through active ownership (Norges Bank 2020c). 
Norges Bank can deviate from the recommendations made by the CoE without justifying its 
decision to the Council. The PetroChina’s bribery scandal illustrates that the escalation process 
of gross corruption cases in the fund is lengthy and lacks efficiency. The publication of the 
final decision is often brief and lacks explicit rationale. Therefore, the communication between 




3 Corruption, bribery, and risk determinants 
3.1 Differentiate corruption, bribery, and extortion 
Several approaches have previously been undertaken to define corruption. From a legal 
perspective, definitions of corruption vastly alternate across jurisdictions, leading to 
inconsistent international anti-corruption endeavors (Astorga et al. 2012:5; Brown 2006:62). 
By law, corruption is not considered to be an illegal act unless defined as such. The principles 
for determining liability in corruption cases are defined by criminal law (Mungan 2012:53). It 
must be determined whether (1) a criminal act has occurred, which is described as active and 
passive bribery of public officials or between the private sectors. (2) Prosecutors must be able 
to identify the responsible individuals involved. Moreover, (3) proof must be secured that the 
crime was committed on purpose, meaning that the person responsible for bribery acted 
blameworthily. Lastly, criminal law requires (4) the absence of legitimate excuses. That being 
said, regulation of corporate liability also varies across countries, which further entangles the 
process to uncover and prosecute corruption offenses (OECD WGB 2015:11). 
In economics and social science, practitioners like Transparency International and scholars 
frequently refer to corruption as the misuse of entrusted or public power for personal profit 
(Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016:9; Shleifer & Vishny 1993:2; Theobald 1990:2). Søreide and 
Rose-Ackerman accentuated the distortive mechanisms at play by describing corruption as “a 
trade in decisions that should not be for sale” (Søreide & Rose-Ackerman 2018:215). 
Corruption is an umbrella concept for several forms of misconduct like bribery, embezzlement, 
nepotism, or judicial fraud (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016:9). 
Consequently, bribery is one aspect of corruption among others. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 
describe bribery as “the explicit exchange of money, gifts in kind, or favors [...] as payment for 
benefits that should [...] be allocated on terms other than willingness to pay” (2016:8). In the 
thesis at hand, the term bribery is used in a broad sense, including kickbacks and extortion. 
Kickbacks are bribes paid after the allocation of the service or good was realized (Morris 
2011:10). In the case of extortion, all bargaining power lies at the side of the bribee, allowing 
to squeeze rents out of the eventually unintentional briber (Mikkelsen 2013:368). Under this 
definition, bribery is often considered the primary form of corruption (Brown 2006:62). 
Especially when focusing on corporate corruption, as is the subject of this thesis, bribery is 
often used interchangeably with corruption (Johnston 2005:20).  
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Since bribery is the predominant form of corruption, some corruption risk determinants can 
also be considered risk determinants for bribery. However, since all cases of bribery fall into 
corruption though not all corruption cases are bribery, corruption risk determinants are only 
considered when the respective determinant is logically relevant for explaining bribery risk. 
Because of the vast number of determinants, the following sections provide a structured 
overview of the most relevant determinants discussed in previous empirical and conceptual 
research papers, rather than constituting an exhaustive list. 
3.2 Country-specific bribery risk 
3.2.1 Country-specific risk determinants 
Bribery risk determinants at the country level can be classified into (a lack of) internal controls 
(1), external controls (2), as well as indirect determinants (3) (Brunetti & Weder 2003:1803). 
Internal controls comprise measures within a country’s bureaucratic system, aiming to prevent 
and enforce corruption in its processes (Brunetti & Weder 2003:1803). One aspect in this 
regard is the mitigation of discretionary power allocated to single officials through supervision, 
for instance, through dual control principles and committee-based decision making. The 
expanded circle of involved parties raises detection risk and sets a higher threshold for corrupt 
collusion (Argandona 2001:166). Similarly, insufficient preventions against nepotistic hiring 
and promoting practices increase the bribery risk in public institutions, as close ties and 
dependencies among officials facilitate misconduct (Rauch & Evans 2000:66-68). Clear 
qualification criteria and standardized public announcements of vacancies can help to prevent 
nepotism (OECD 2020:94). Furthermore, substantial discrepancies between public and private 
sector wages can act as a booster for bribery. By help of a multiple equilibria model, Andvig 
and Moene (1990) show how such a difference can facilitate a long-term high corruption 
equilibrium. The authors argue that public officials converge to collude in bribery to 
counterbalance the payment gap to the private sector. Finally, a lack of transparency in the 
decision-making process of officials is a red flag for corruption risk at the country level, leading 
to lower internal prevention of corruption and impeding external enforcement of applicable 
law (Søreide 2014:48-49). 
External controls refer to measures exercised by parties outside the bureaucratic system 
(Brunetti & Weder 2003:1803). A system of checks and balances and independent control 
institutions are fundamental for effective deterrence and enforcement of public corruption. 
Independent courts, as well as economic crime units and financial regulation institutions, are 
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required for raising the risk of detection and thus lowering the expected net gain of bribery. 
Establishing anti-corruption agencies is appropriate if the prevalent enforcement institutions 
like the police are at risk of being subverted by corruption. Respective competencies and 
responsibilities must be codified through rules or laws (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, pp. 
391+411). Anti-corruption laws can be embedded in criminal or corporate law. Public 
procurement law entails fair and standardized contracting with private counterparties. In 
addition, anti-trust laws and authorities nurture competition and meritocracy, whose absence is 
a prerequisite for corruption (Søreide 2014:16). Yet, Billger and Goel (2009:303) show that 
the existence of corruption control policies does not significantly decrease corruption in a 
cross-country comparison, indicating that a plain installation of anti-corruption laws and 
institutions is not sufficient to fight corruption. Independence and impartiality of control 
institutions and the legal system must be ensured to make laws and control bodies work 
effectively (Andvig & Moene 1990:76; Søreide 2014:9-10). 
Besides official authorities, NGOs and the free press are crucial external contributors to a 
country’s successful anti-corruption endeavors (Billger & Goel 2009; Brunetti & Weder 2003; 
Treisman 2007). Their role is to monitor public officials and inform the general public about 
infringements of laws (Kalenborn & Lessmann 2013:858-59). Thus, NGOs and the media 
contribute to the accountability of democratically elected representatives by eradicating 
information asymmetries between the public as the principals and their elected agents (Rose-
Ackerman & Palifka 2016:402). 
Lastly, there are several indirect drivers mentioned in previous empirical research, whereof 
many are connected to a country’s culture. For instance, empirical studies underpin that 
countries with prevailing Tribal and reformed Christian religions have a lower perceived 
corruption risk (Paldam 2001:411). Also, colonial heritage and education were identified as 
significant drivers of corruption (Escresa & Picci 2019:368; Serra 2006:229). Boateng et al. 
(2020) examined the impact of different cultural factors on perceived corruption in different 
countries. They found elevated levels of corruption where perceived and accepted hierarchies 
in society are substantial. Individualism and the average level of happiness negatively correlate 
with perceived corruption at a statistically significant level. Remarkably, they find that these 
three factors moderate the effect of good corporate governance leading to a lower level of 
corruption (Boateng et al. 2020:12-14). 
Aside from cultural factors, economic development, usually measured as GDP per capita, is 
often associated with a negative relation to corruption, meaning that wealthier countries tend 
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to have lower corruption risk (Billger & Goel 2009:300; Treisman 2007:241). However, cause 
and correlation are hard to disentangle in this case due to multicollinearity of GDP per capita 
and perceived corruption on various factors, such as cultural determinants (Mauro 1995:702). 
Lastly, an opaque financial system facilitates corruption, since illicit payments need to be 
laundered through the financial system before they can be spent by the beneficiary. The easier 
it is to set up a broad network of shell companies to disguise illegitimate money transfers, the 
lower the encountered detection risk (Søreide 2014:13-14). 
Empirical evidence about the strength of different drivers on corruption is difficult to establish. 
Reverse causality poses difficulties for a causal interpretation of findings, as most studies apply 
correlations or regressions. On one hand, a corrupt executive system could lead to ineffective 
institutions as corrupt decision-makers undermine the power of controls. On the other hand, 
weak institutions could increase opportunities for corrupt behavior due to the low risk of 
detection and punishment. Moreover, multicollinearity among the drivers, for instance between 
the free press and economic development measured as GDP per capita (Brunetti & Weder 
2003:1822), hampers the identification of a specific driver’s effect at the country level 
corruption risk. 
3.2.2 Measurement of country-specific bribery risk 
Measuring corruption and bribery is an arduous undertaking since it aims to capture hardly 
observable behavior. Due to its illegal nature, corruption usually remains concealed since 
involved parties seek to disguise their actions and hinder information flows to the public (Rose-
Ackerman & Palifka 2016:14). Yet, researchers developed different approaches to capture 
corruption risk at the country level through public opinion or expert surveys (1), composite 
indices (2), and empirical measures (3). 
Surveys of experts or the general public (1) aim to identify the prevalence of corruption in 
different countries by accessing subjective information about the perception of and the 
experience with corruption in a specific country. Hence, this type of measurement relies on the 
assumption that the true level of bribery is reflected by the people’s personal experience with 
bribery. A well-known example is the Varieties of Democracy survey, which considers 
questionnaire responses from academics and practitioners (V-Dem Institute 2020). One benefit 
of surveys is the scalability of data access since they can be conducted in different countries, 
given an international network was established to carry out the interviews. Furthermore, 
experiences and perceptions can accumulate several manifestations and drivers of corruption, 
which might be hard to disentangle and measure separately (Sue & Ritter 2012:5).  
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The major downside of using surveys is the subjectivity of responses. The respondents’ 
opinions can be biased by circumstances surrounding the conduction of the survey. As an 
illustration, the disclosure of a highly scrutinized corruption scandal can raise corruption 
perception, resulting in distorted survey responses (Tversky & Kahneman 1973:206-07). 
Finally, the number and characteristics of respondents across countries can vary and thereby 
introduce biases when comparing responses globally. These problems are underpinned by 
empirical studies showcasing how social background affects the perception of corruption 
(Maeda & Ziegfeld 2015:4).  
Composite Indices (2) aim to mitigate some of the problems attached to questionnaires by 
considering multiple sources of qualitative and quantitative empirical data such as political 
stability or characteristics of the legal system (Mauro 1995:686). Included empirical data 
usually refers to some of the aforementioned corruption risk determinants. For instance, the 
TRACE Matrix uses indices from the Bertelsmann Foundation to approximate freedom of 
speech (TRACE 2019b:4). The different data points across sources are normalized and 
aggregated for each country. The final score of a country is often transformed into a corruption 
ranking (Lambsdorff 2007:2). An advantage of composite indices is the utilization of large 
number of data points and sources, limiting the effect of idiosyncratic biases within a survey 
while mitigating differences in data availability across countries. Moreover, the usage of 
variables besides the perception of corruption allows to account for more objective 
determinants of corruption risk but might be neglected by subjective cognitions. However, 
there are drawbacks. A composite index’s outcomes can still be influenced by its previous 
results, as expert surveys often account for most of the included sources. Also, normalization 
and aggregation of different data sources with different dimensions can lead to loss of 
information and accuracy, which leads to large confidence intervals of estimates. Finally, many 
indices revise their methodology and refine the underlying data sources over the years, making 
time comparisons potentially misleading (Chabova 2017:1880). Therefore, we refrain from 
time-series analyses for determining corruption risk in the Norwegian GPFG.  
With the rise of available public data, many scholars attempted to objectivize corruption 
measures by creating empirical indices (3) based on empirically measurable proxy variables 
(Denly 2020; Escresa & Picci 2017; Golden & Picci 2005; Picci 2018). Golden and Picci 
(2005) propose an index that compares the realized physical construction projects with public 
construction expenses across different regions in Italy. They assume higher corruption in 
regions where the ratio of money spent on physical infrastructure compared to realized 
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infrastructure is large. Another index, developed by Escresa and Picci (2017), approximates 
the level of corruption in a country by comparing the share of enforced cross-border bribery 
cases involving foreign public officials to the export volume from briber to bribee economy. A 
higher ratio indicates a higher bribery risk of the briber country. These indices benefit from 
using non-perception-based data, which eliminates unconscious irrationalities and endogeneity 
of composite index results. On the flip side, the chosen proxy variables might not provide 
meaningful global comparisons and their application is limited due to a lack of data for some 
countries. 
3.3 Industry-specific bribery risk 
3.3.1 Industry-specific risk determinants 
Every industry has idiosyncratic characteristics that companies need to address through their 
business models. Some industries’ characteristics provide a nourishing soil for bribery, leading 
to a systematically higher bribery exposure of companies in respective industries. 
The OECD Foreign Bribery Report (2014) revealed that 57% of enforced international bribery 
cases between 1999 and 2014 were conducted to obtain public procurement contracts. 
Although enforcement data in itself does not reflect bribery risk, firms from industries like 
construction, defense, and human health, in which companies operate as suppliers of the 
public, have been frequently involved in bribery cases. This is supported by analytical 
argumentation: incentives for firms to pay bribes to secure procurement contracts are salient 
since the potential net present value (NPV) of these contracts can be large (Rose-Ackerman & 
Palifka 2016:96). A rent-seeking counterparty in the deal with discretionary power over the 
procurement decision is well-positioned to negotiate a share of the company’s NPV for 
personal gain (Li, S. 2019:6; Søreide 2002:4-5). Moreover, bribery risk intensifies in sectors 
where the average contract volume is high, since any single contract is of high value (or NPV) 
for the supplier and hence, incentives to conduct illicit payments in exchange for an unfair 
competitive advantage amplify (Davis, J. 2004:58). 
Other common sources for public officials to retrieve bribes are concessions and operating 
licenses, granting firms the right to use or extract public resources like land, mines, highways, 
or oil fields. Søreide and Rose-Ackerman (2018:198-200) delineate that collusive deals are 
most harmful to society when the allocating resource is scarce and the allocation process 
qualification steered. Concessions and licenses fulfill both aspects. The underlying assets, such 
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as oil fields, are scarce and the company which qualifies best during the tender process should 
receive the grant (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016:110). 
Moreover, highly regulated industries allow for more discretionary power of officials charged 
with regulating and controlling companies operating in these sectors. This includes 
monopolistic or oligopolistic industries like utilities or oil and gas, where government 
intervention is a common act to balance welfare distribution between supplier(s) and customers 
(OECD WGB 2015:10). Scholars claim that in these industries bribery is frequently used as a 
lever to influence decision-makers to reallocate welfare from the customers’ side to the 
supplier’s side in exchange for private gain of the official (Søreide 2002:5-6). This can be 
accomplished by aiming either at diminishing costs, like taxes and fees or on enhancing 
revenues (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016:51). 
Finally, the number of interactions with authorities and public officials can systematically vary 
across industries. For instance, the transportation and real estate industry depends on the 
customs clearance and property or land registry process, respectively (Søreide 2014:9-10). 
Where companies’ business models depend on the efficiency of public processes, bribe 
payments can become crucial contributors to a firm’s competitiveness by reducing lead times 
and enhancing process efficiency. This lifts the bribee’s bargaining power to demand illicit 
payments and the briber’s willingness to pay, especially in countries where public processes 
are cumbersome and lengthy (Cuervo-Cazurra 2016:40). 
3.3.2 Measurement of industry-specific bribery risk 
Although various scholars examined the risks and prevalence of bribery within specific 
industries (OECD WGB 2015; Feinstein et al. 2011; Kenny & Søreide 2009), few comparative 
empirical analyses of corruption across industries have previously been developed. This is 
mainly because of two reasons. First, the realization of industry-specific risk factors is linked 
to country-specific risk factors. Exemplarily, corruption risk in industries requiring concessions 
is linked to a country’s legal requirements and anti-corruption regulations for tender processes 
(Kenny & Søreide 2009:14). Second, there is no responsible addressee for systematic 
shortcomings in an industry. Country indices aim to showcase shortcomings in specific 
jurisdictions to facilitate improvement of the legal and institutional framework (Søreide 
2006:2). Unlike in the case of countries, no ultimately responsible addressee exists for 
particular industries. 
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One well-known empirical approach to compare corruption across industries is TI`s Bribe 
Payers Index (BPI) from 2011. The survey examines perceptions on bribery of 3,000 business 
executives from 28 countries. The respondents are asked to assess the likelihood of a company 
from a particular industry to pay a bribe on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 means that a company 
never pays a bribe (Transparency International 2011:4). The assessments range narrowly from 
5.3 points (construction) to 7.1 (agriculture), though still indicate significant differences across 
sectors. For instance, the 95% confidence interval of Power Generation (Rank 13), ranging 
from 6.1 to 6.6, is strictly below the one of Consumer Services (Rank 7) with a confidence 
interval from 6.7 to 6.9 (Transparency International 2011:15). 
The World Bank Enterprise Survey covers information on a vast range of company information 
from 169,000 firms in 146 countries. Besides financial and organizational indicators, the survey 
collects information on a broad range of compliance topics, including bribe and facilitation 
payments transferred to public officials (World Bank 2020). Although the survey only contains 
information on bribery at the firm level, its global setup and the inclusion of companies from 
all industries make it a promising source to examine bribery risk across industries. However, 
until this thesis was finalized, no reports have been published analyzing the data for this 
purpose. We tried to conduct a similar analysis by ourselves but were restricted by the lack of 
granularity regarding the information on industries contained in the survey.4 
The OECD Foreign Bribery Report (2014) and ACFE’s Report to the Nations (2020) present 
two approaches to analyze previous investigation cases. While ACFE considers embezzlement, 
bribery, money laundering, and other corruption cases experienced by ACFE members (ACFE 
2020:6-7), the OECD report solely examines officially enforced cross-country bribery cases 
(OECD 2014:7). Judicial statistics of corruption cases have little reliability, as a corrupt legal 
and political system impedes efficient corruption enforcement. Considering cross-country 
enforcement cases avoids biases resulting from conflicts of interests, as the enforcing country 
is different from the one potentially involved in the crime (Escresa & Picci 2017:197). This is 
relevant for industry-specific risks, as countries with high corruption levels tend to have 
increased exposure to the extraction industry, also known as the resource curse (Davis, G. & 
Tilton 2005:233). Consequently, cross-country enforcement can be assumed to portray a less 
biased picture of bribery across industries, which is why we used the OECD Foreign Bribery 
Report together with the BPI for estimating bribery risk differences across industries. 
 
4 Our attempt to utilize this data is explained in more detail under section 4.2.2. 
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3.4 Firm-specific bribery risk 
3.4.1 Firm-specific risk determinants 
Besides risk factors related to countries and industries where a company operates, certain 
organizational and managerial firm-level characteristics also impact the vulnerability to 
bribery. Research shows that these factors include customer base composition (Cosenz & Noto 
2014:243), perceived financial constraints (Martin et al. 2007:1416), ownership structure 
(Clarke & Xu 2004:5), the proximity to politics (Kenny & Søreide 2009:11), corporate anti-
corruption endeavors (Transparency International 2014:32-33), third party usage (Drugov et 
al. 2013), and previous involvement in bribery cases (Ryder & Pasculli 2020). 
A firm’s customer base composition is the ratio between public and private clients. Firms 
involved in public procurement may utilize bribery as a marketing vehicle to establish 
relationships and boost sales. Simultaneously, public procurement officials might exploit their 
discretionary power to request illicit money transfers. In this situation, both parties can benefit 
from an illegal sale of the decision, leading to a platform for collusive bribery (Cosenz & Noto 
2014:243). 
Martin et al. (2007:1414) argue that monetary restrictions such as collateral obligations, 
unfavorable interest rates, local banks’ lack of resources, and internal budget constraints 
increase the firm’s probability of supplying bribes to public officials. These factors can be 
generally described as perceived financial constraints. Although the argument that bribes are 
used when financial constraints hamper organic growth is plausible, it is challenging to 
establish empirical proof for this claim. Since at the macro level several other factors with a 
presumably causal effect on bribery, like political stability and GDP per income, correlate with 
interest rates, it is difficult to distinguish correlation and causation in this case (Cebula 
2011:65). 
Clark and Xu (2004) argue that ownership structure matters for bribery risk since beneficiaries 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often unclear and cannot exercise controlling and 
monitoring rights directly. In this case, the ultimate beneficiaries of the investment can be, 
among others, the government treasury, pensioners, or general citizens. Unlike private 
blockholders, these groups can monitor the executive board only through proxies with confined 
personal interest, potentially putting less pressure on management to reduce corruption under 
public ownership. In addition, principal-agent problems are more severe in public enterprises, 
as salaries might be tied to public labor agreements, making payments of performance-based 
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bonuses and stock options difficult (Clarke & Xu 2004:5). State ownership further implies 
closer personal connections to politics and the public that might facilitate bribe payments 
(Kenny & Søreide 2009:6). Although descriptive approaches draw a clear picture of state 
ownership adversely affecting corruption, empirical research studies found both negative and 
positive effects of state ownership on corruption (Billon & Gillanders 2016:1076). Arikan 
(2008:724-25) sheds light on this puzzle by finding that privatization limits corruption only if 
ties of politics to the company management are properly unraveled. However, the author claims 
that this would often not be the case in transition countries where perceived corruption is high. 
Thus, samples that include mainly respective countries reveal a nonsignificant or even adverse 
empirical effect of privatization on corruption. 
As bribery requires trust among the involved parties, proximity to politics can signal elevated 
risk. These connections can be established via lobbying efforts (Kenny & Søreide 2009:11). 
Both bribery and lobbying are viewed as a means to influence the regulatory environment, but 
the distinction between these two practices is often vague. Harstad and Svensson (2011:46) 
refer to lobbying as an activity that aims to change existing rules or policies, whereas bribing 
is described as an attempt to get around these regulations. Furthermore, ties to the government 
may root in personal connections, like politically exposed persons (PEPs)5 among the 
management or shareholders of a firm (Choo 2008:374). 
Internal anti-corruption practices also influence bribery risk at the firm level. Empirical studies 
show that compliance programs are an efficient lever to prevent and fight corruption within the 
corporation (McKinney et al. 2010:512). The presence of a whistleblower policy, a 
comprehensive code of business ethics and suppliers’ conduct, and well-designed anti-
corruption regulations can support and promote good behavior (Bussmann et al. 2017:258). 
Although existing compliance programs without proper implementation in the organization are 
little effective in preventing bribery (McKinney et al. 2010:513), public reporting on the key 
elements of anti-corruption programs like whistleblower protections signal an awareness of the 
topic and stresses the accountability of an organization and its employees for misconduct 
(Transparency International 2014:32-33). 
The involvement of agents and other third parties such as consulting or law firms is a frequently 
used scheme in historic foreign country bribery cases, such as the BAE Systems (TRACE 2014) 
and Daimler cases (TRACE 2016) showcased previously. Intermediaries support the exchange 
 
5 Although there is no commonly agreed definition of PEPs, they are frequently referred to as natural persons with 
current or previous political functions or such individuals’ close family members and associates (Choo, 2007:372). 
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between buyers and sellers by utilizing knowledge in sellers’ goods and buyers’ needs, hence 
lowering bargaining costs, while building a reputation for credibility (Drugov et al. 2013:79). 
Consequently, middlemen are often utilized because they remove uncertainty regarding whom 
and how much to bribe, and thus reduce the risk of detection for both the briber and the bribee 
(Hasker & Okten 2008:104). Additionally, detection of bribery initiated by an agent may find 
the agent guilty, while the involved parties may keep their anonymity. If exposed, firms can 
deny responsibility by arguing that the intermediary bribed on its own initiative. Moreover, 
Drugov (2013:79) shows that intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral costs 
of the companies and public officials possibly involved in bribery. 
The presence of previous bribery allegations can signal inadequate bribery prevention systems 
and deficiencies in the firms’ anti-corruption practices. Using a dataset describing the business 
activities of 530 Swiss firms, Ryder and Pasculli (2020: Chapter 14) show that the likelihood 
of facing bribe requests is higher for firms with previous involvement. The authors specify that 
more than half of the firms in the study that were requested for illicit payments have been asked 
more than once. However, corruption enforcement actions can also improve internal control 
systems and compliance practices in the long run. Siemens is an interesting example. After 
having used a variety of methods to make illegal payments to government officials between 
2001 and 2007, totaling approximately $1.4 billion (TRACE 2020a). Following the scandal, 
Siemens introduced strict rules and anti-corruption processes, hired numerous compliance 
officers, and established an external ombudsman. Moreover, in an attempt to change its internal 
culture, it launched a comprehensive training and education program on anti-corruption 
practices for its employees (Löscher 2012).  
3.4.2 Measurement of firm-specific bribery risk 
To the best of our knowledge, when this thesis was finalized in May 2021, a comprehensive 
indicator that measures firm-level bribery risk had not yet been constructed. However, some 
scholars have developed analytical approaches for firm-level analyses of corruption, which will 
be outlined in this section alongside the benefits and shortcomings. 
The most simplistic method is to directly apply country-level or regional data of corruption as 
an indicator for firm-level corruption (Athanasouli & Goujard 2015:1017). The shortcomings 
of this approach are obvious. It implicitly assumes that for a sufficiently large sample, firm and 
industry-specific factors cancel each other out, and the aggregated corruption level converges 
towards the country- or region-level corruption risk. This assumption only makes sense for 
research designs where regions or countries shall be compared by analyzing firms that are later 
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aggregated on a regional level. Athanasouli and Goujard (2015), for instance, applied regional 
corruption data to examine the effects of management practices on corruption in companies 
from different regions in central and eastern Europe. However, to measure and compare bribery 
risk at the firm level, this method is insufficient. 
More reliable measures of bribery at the firm level are enterprise surveys. Asking respondents 
to what degree bribery occurs in their company is frequently used to measure corruption on the 
supply side of bribery (De Rosa et al. 2010:3). Examples are the Uganda Industrial Enterprise 
Survey (Reinikka & Collier 2001:207), the World Bank Enterprise Survey (World Bank 2020), 
and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), where 
respondents were asked to determine how often bribe payments were part of a transaction (De 
Rosa et al. 2010:11). Fisman and Svensson (2007) applied the Uganda survey results as an 
indicator for the firm-level bribery risk to analyze how bribery affects firm growth. However, 
the accuracy of survey responses is influenced by the trust in the party conducting the survey. 
Questions from a research organization that aims to analyze the risk of bribery within a specific 
industry or region might be answered more freely than for investors reaching out to evaluate 
potential targets (Reinikka & Collier 2001:467). The major setback of enterprise survey data 
is that it cannot be applied to any company. To use such data to derive conclusions about the 
bribery risk of firms in the GPFG portfolio, one would be constrained by the fact that a 
particular company would have participated in an enterprise survey. However, since the names 
of companies are usually encrypted, enterprise surveys do not constitute an appropriate source 
for measuring bribery risk in the GPFG. 
This problem is addressed by another approach that analyses firms’ anti-corruption efforts in 
public reports. Since transparency acts as the converse of corruption, company data about 
transparency may be used to approximate the firm-level risk of a company being involved in 
bribery. These approaches hinge on the assumptions that firms report less about corruption 
compliance topics where they lack adequate internal controls and therefore face a higher risk 
(Lopatta et al. 2017:51-52). TI suggests a systematic approach that analyzes public disclosures 
of companies regarding 26 factors categorized in companies’ anti-corruption programs and 
internal controls (1), organizational transparency of subsidiaries (2), and country-by-country 
reporting of key financial and non-financial performance indicators (3) (Transparency 
International 2014:32-33). Lopatta et al. (2017) follow a similar methodology. The authors 
create a list of around 200 nouns, adjectives, and verbs related to corruption and count how 
often these terms are mentioned in the audited annual reports of each firm. The firms are then 
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sorted into quintiles, where the quintile with the lowest number of respective terms in the report 
is considered the quintile with the highest risk of corruption (Lopatta et al. 2017:52).  
Both approaches validly imply that transparency generally mitigates corruption, which requires 
hidden agreements, opaque transfers, and disguising accounting practices (Halter et al. 
2009:375). Moreover, the external communication of anti-corruption endeavors, like 
whistleblower programs and the refused reprisal of whistleblowers, gives employees more 
certainty when speaking up and allows them to accuse companies of deviating from reported 
compliance principles (Luz & Spagnolo 2017:734). On the downside, only evaluating what a 
company communicates about corruption efforts without looking at actually implemented 
procedures leaves this approach vulnerable to window-dressing, which describes the 
presentation of rules, guidelines, and processes that are not followed up and lived by the 
organization (Lindstedt & Naurin 2010:301). Especially for the approach of Lopatta et al. 
(2017), it remains questionable whether the inflated usage of corruption-related words in the 
annual report indeed signals higher transparency and compliance. Higher coverage of pertinent 
terms might be triggered by events like external investigations, forcing a company to consider 
these topics in their annual report, rather than proactive transparency aspirations. 
3.5 Overview 
Previous literature describes several determinants of bribery risk on different levels. They are 
attributable to the jurisdiction and culture (country-level), the business model shaped by the 
industry (industry-level) as well as different organizational and managerial factors (firm-level). 
These factors are summarized in Figure 3. Measurement of corruption is mainly developed at 
the country level, where several profound indices exist, aiming to estimate what is intentionally 
hidden. As Figure 3 depicts, moving to industry-specific measures of bribery risk, similar 
comprehensive composite indices do not exist. Even fewer approaches have been developed to 
measure firm-specific corruption and bribery risk. Therefore, empirical data from the Bribe 
Payers Index (2011) and the OECD Foreign Bribery Report (2014) are aggregated to create an 
indicator that ranks industries based on their inherent bribery risk. To quantify the bribery risk 
of particular firms, a completely new indicator, the FBRI, is created. 
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Figure 3: Overview bribery risk determinants and measurement  
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4 Empirical methodology 
The purpose of this study is to examine the bribery risk in the Norwegian GPFG, which is 
pursued in a twofold analysis. In an initial step, a comparative approach is presented, which 
includes all portfolio companies but solely considers the country-level risk of the investments. 
Secondly, utilizing a sample drawn from the GPFG portfolio, the firm-specific bribery risk is 
analyzed by developing an indicator, the FBRI, to identify red flags that signal increased 
potential of a company to pay bribes in its course of business. By doing so, we contribute to 
existing research by proposing a data-driven indicator of bribery risk at the firm level. This 
indicator is used to study the relationship between country-level bribery risk and the firm-
specific bribery risk from the bribe payer’s side. 
4.1 Country-level bribery risk comparison 
For an initial overview of the bribery risk exposure of the GPFG, the fund’s portfolio is 
compared to a selected peer group of sovereign wealth funds. The comparison is carried out by 
considering the bribery risk of the investment’s primary listing countries. Consequently, the 
analysis merely examines the inherent country-specific bribery risk of the holdings and 
disregards their industry- and firm-specific bribery risks. This simplification is required given 
two reasons. Firstly, information regarding the investments’ business sectors is not available 
for all funds. Furthermore, the sheer number of firms included in the portfolios makes the 
collection of firm-specific risk indicators unfeasible. The TRACE Matrix’s overall country risk 
score is used as an estimation for assigning a bribery score to each holding. 
4.1.1 Peer selection of sovereign wealth funds 
To investigate the country-specific bribery risk of the GPFG, we construct a benchmark set of 
sovereign wealth funds. This set comprises the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZ Super), 
the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC), and the Dutch Algemeen Burgerlijk 
Pensioenfonds (ABP). The rationale for selecting funds for benchmarking is threefold. Firstly, 
in parallel with the portfolio of the GPFG, the investments of the chosen wealth funds are 
required to be highly diversified across multiple industries in a wide range of countries. Table 
1 shows that all funds are well diversified and invested across 50 or more nations. Thereby, 
potential biases due to the size of the fund, measured by assets under management, are 
mitigated. Furthermore, the country-specific corruption risk of the countries owning the wealth 
funds has to be comparative to the one of Norway. This is approximated with the TRACE 
Matrix Scores. SWFs frequently invest a large share of their AUM in the domestic economy 
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as a capital stimulus for domestic firms. Thus, comparing the GPFG to SWFs from high bribery 
risk countries could lead to biased results because of the higher share of investments in 
domestic countries. Therefore, we only include funds with comparable domestic country 
bribery risk in the analysis of this thesis. Lastly, the selection process is influenced by the 
provision of exhaustive, publicly available data on the pension funds’ portfolios, including the 
market values of all firms. The chosen peer funds suffice in all aspects mentioned above as 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Sovereign wealth funds in the empirical study 
Beyond the selected peer funds, we accessed information regarding two additional portfolios: 
the Investment Corporation of Dubai and the Mubadala Investment Company. Both funds are 
owned and operated by the government of the United Arab Emirates. Their equity portfolio, 
however, is less diversified than the GPFG, with only less than one hundred equities per fund. 
In addition, the United Arab Emirates’ bribery score of 33 is clearly above Norway’s country 
 GPFG NZ Super ABP APFC 
Countries in 
portfolio 
73 50 56 70 
Number of 
equities 
9,202 6,541 3,539 11,545 
AUM (USD) 814 billion 13 billion 210 billion 19 billion 
TRACE bribery 
risk score 
5 8 11 20 
TRACE risk 
category 








the oil discovery 
in the North 
Sea. The first 
amount was 
deposited in the 
fund in 1996. 
The New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund 
is the sovereign 
wealth fund of New 
Zealand. The fund 
began investing after 
it received an initial 
contribution of $2.4 
billion from the 
government of New 
Zealand in 
September 2003. 





in the Netherlands. Its 
predecessor, the Dutch 
Civil Servants Pension 
Fund was established in 
1922 following the 





created by the Alaska 
Legislature in 1980 as 
a quasi-independent 
state entity tasked 
with the mission of 
investing and 
managing the assets 
of the Alaska 
Permanent Fund. 
25 
risk and hence does not fall into the very low TRACE risk category6. Based on these 
differences, these funds are not considered comparable to the GPFG and therefore not included 
in the peer group. 
4.1.2 Estimating the country-level bribery risk 
The country-level bribery risk of each equity investment is determined by the TRACE Bribery 
Risk Matrix (TRACE Matrix) score of the investee’s primary listing country. Some of the well-
known composite indices include the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), World Banks’s Control of Corruption (CoC), and the TRACE Matrix. The 
TRACE Matrix does not only utilize the largest number of sources among the three; it also 
provides disaggregated scores for 194 countries in four different dimensions.7 This allows for 
a more granular analysis of bribery risk. Despite the drawbacks of composite indices, the 
TRACE Matrix’s transparency regarding its data collection and aggregation, along with the 
wide range of countries included in the index, makes it a suitable tool for empirical analysis.  
For reflecting country level bribery risk the primary listing country is preferred over the 
incorporation country since incorporation is often conducted in tax-favorable jurisdictions 
without any operational relevance to a company’s business. On the contrary, the primary listing 
country is usually selected for strategic reasons, as it provides direct access to equity investors 
in the respective country. IPO signaling theory claims that high-quality firms signal quality by 
choosing stock markets where listing requirements are strict (Wong et al. 2014:565).The share 
of equities for which incorporation and listing country deviate account for less than 8% of the 
GPFG portfolio investments. Hence, the listing and incorporation country equal for the clear 
majority of firms in the GPFG, but for firms where listing and incorporation country deviate, 
the listing country is assumed to be a better proxy for a company’s main operations country. 
As an example for the consequent score assignment, the Brazilian company Petrobas, primarily 
listed at the B3 exchange in São Paolo, is assigned a bribery risk score of 47, the TRACE 
Matrix total risk score of Brazil.  
In addition to the TRACE Matrix, the World Bank’s Control of Corruption (WB-CoC) and 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (TI-CPI) are applied to run a 
robustness check to verify the previous results. Since the scores of the WB-CoC range between 
 
6 An overview of the bribery risk categories very low, low, moderate, high, and very high of the TRACE Matrix, 
including the threshold scores, is provided in Appendix A. Whenever we refer to the risk categories defined by 
TRACE, italic font is used for the category names. 
7 More detailed information on the TRACE Matrix is provided in section 5.1.2. 
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-3 and 3, they are normalized on a range between 0 and 100. Using this transformation makes 
the results directly comparable with each other. 
4.2 Firm-level bribery risk analysis 
To examine the relationship between listing country bribery risk and firm bribery risk, an 
indicator for the latter is established as current literature does not provide a comprehensive 
measure. This section outlines the creation of the Firm Bribery Risk Indicator (FBRI). 
Subsequently, we describe the input variables that measure different bribery risk determinants 
and their accumulation, including the weighting of variables to determine the final FBRI score. 
4.2.1 The Firm Bribery Risk Indicator 
The FBRI is designed to identify red flags at the company level, which signal an elevated 
potential for bribery involvement. It is developed as a potential tool for practitioners and other 
scholars in both, portfolio compliance controls and empirical studies at the firm level. 
The FBRI scores range between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating higher bribery risk. 
It is an interval-scaled measure. This means that the same interval indicates the same incline in 
bribery risk potential for the full range of possible values. An FBRI score of 40 signals higher 
risk than a score of 20, though it does not imply that the former is twice as risky as the latter, a 
property that only occurs for ratio scaled measurement. This is due to the lack of an absolute 
zero point. An FBRI score of zero cannot entail that the respective company is not engaged in 
bribery with certainty. 
The selection of variables, serving as the inputs for calculating the FBRI score, is derived from 
bribery risk determinants and measurements presented in the literature review. All three levels 




Table 2: Conceptual overview of FBRI variables 
No. Risk Level Risk Factor Measurement Variable 
1 Country-Level 
Bribery risk in 
operating countries 






Bribery risk in 
operating industries 
Industry bribery index based on TI 





Management quality & 
anti-corruption efforts 
Anti-corruption efforts in public 
reports based on the TI TCR Report 
Bribery Prevention 
4 Firm-Level Public ownership 
Direct and indirect ownership of 




History of bribery 
involvement 
Number of previous allegations 




6 Firm-Level Proximity to politics Number of PEPs at the board level Political Exposure 
The variables are selected to capture the most relevant determinants that impact the bribery risk 
of the company (compare Figure 3, p. 17). At the country level, the TRACE Matrix 
accumulates several data points regarding the external and internal controls for bribery in a 
country, as well as cultural factors. The interplay between risk determinants at the firm and 
industry level is fluent. Risk factors shaping an industry always apply to all firms operating in 
that particular industry. Thus, it is crucial to reflect which measures can vary strongly across 
companies even when operating within the same industry and are consequently worth the time 
being investigated individually at the firm level. Risk determinants that are similar for 
companies operating in the same industry are consequently not investigated separately at the 
firm level but are assumed to be indirectly covered by the industry-level risk measure. For 
example, the risk determinant Customer Base Composition (compare Figure 3, p. 17), which 
indicates the share of public authorities and institutions among a company’s customers, is 
assumed to be systematically different across industries. Defense and construction companies 
will have more public clients among their customers than grocery wholesalers. Thus, these risk 
determinants are considered through the bribery risk of the industry although they could be 
theoretically measured at the firm level. 
Having outlined this, certain risk determinants are not represented in the FBRI due to a lack of 
accurate data or an excessively time-consuming data collection process. For instance, 
information regarding the quantity and quality of third-party usage is usually kept concealed. 
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Hence, the prevalence of third parties in a company’s operations and its inherent bribery risk 
is not included in the indicator. 
The following paragraphs delineate the six chosen variables, demonstrate the assignment of 
scores, and discuss the weighting of variables in the aggregation to create the FBRI score. 
 Operating Countries and Subsidiary Industries 
The legal, political, and cultural environment in countries, where business contracts are 
negotiated and interactions with public authorities exist, is relevant for the bribery exposure of 
a company (Søreide 2014:5). Consequently, only looking at the headquarter or listing country 
is not exhaustive when determining a firm’s bribery risk resulting from its legal and cultural 
environment of operations. Previous cases have shown that corporations headquartered in low-
risk countries benefit by illicitly securing public contracts in highly corrupt countries (Pollack 
& Allern 2018:73). Two examples are the cases of Telia (Finland and Sweden) as well as 
Telenor’s (Norway) joint venture Vimpelcom, both bribing Uzbek president’s daughter 
Gulnara Karimova to gain operating contracts for several years starting in 2012 (Pollack & 
Allern 2018:74). 
Companies usually keep their exact customers and operating countries concealed. 
Consequently, the subsidiaries’ incorporation countries are used to approximate operating 
countries, since legal presence in a jurisdiction requires the company to become integrated into 
the local legal system. This occurs through channeling funds in the country, hiring employees, 
and establishing contacts with other local businesses on the demand or supply side. Again, the 
TRACE overall bribery risk score is applied to measure each subsidiary’s country bribery risk. 
As the FBRI is designed to capture bribery red flags, the score of the variable Operating 
Countries is calculated based on the average score of the three countries with the highest 
bribery risk. Thus, only the upwards outlier countries are considered. Applying a simple 
average across all subsidiary risk scores is rejected, as a multinational corporation can be at 
high risk to pay bribes through operations in high-risk countries like Uzbekistan or the 
Philippines, even though the vast majority of its subsidiaries and operations are centered in a 
low-risk country like Norway. Consequently, bribery risk arising from upwards outlier 
countries would have been underestimated.  
Given that country-level bribery risk is used to calculate the Operating Countries variable in 
the FBRI, one might concern about endogeneity issues when comparing the FBRI with the 
listing country bribery risk scores. However, since the Operating Country score is the average 
29 
TRACE score of the subsidiaries’ three most risky incorporation countries, the variable might 
be correlated to the primary listing country but is not a function of it, resolving the endogeneity 
concerns. 
The same logic is applied for the variable Subsidiary Industries. Conglomerates often operate 
in many different industries, some more exposed to bribery than others. For this research, 
operating sectors are segmented into twelve different industries, as depicted in Appendix B. 
The segmentation is leaned on previous research, proposing systematic differences in bribery 
risk across these industries. For instance, the OECD WGB (2015) highlights the harmful 
consequences of corruption in the extraction, utilities, and health sectors. Feinstein et al. (2011: 
16) elaborate that intense personnel exchange between the governments, the military, and 
suppliers increases bribery risk in the defense industry. Finally, the categorization of industries 
in the BPI (2011) and OECD-FBR (2014) serves as a basis for defining a nuanced yet concise 
industry segregation for our analysis. 
To map the given SIC codes of subsidiaries retrieved from Orbis, a list is created which maps 
each of the possible three-digit SIC codes to one of the twelve defined industries.8 The 
Subsidiary Industries score is calculated analogously to the Operating Countries score by 
calculating the arithmetic average of the three industries with the highest bribery risk following 
the Industry Bribery Risk Score (IBRS). Section 4.2.2 outlines in detail how bribery risk ranks 
and the IBRS are assigned to the twelve industries. 
 Ownership structure 
State ownership implies closer connections to public officials and politicians, making bribery 
safer for the involved parties as mutual trust is established and interests are aligned. Although 
state ownership does not automatically imply corruption, as indicated by equivocal empirical 
results (Billon & Gillanders 2016:1076), it still constitutes a red flag. In a survey conducted by 
the OECD (2018:11-12) 42% of SOE employees responded that corrupt practices occurred in 
the organization over the last three years, while relations to the government were perceived as 
the major cause of integrity issues. For this reason, Ownership Structure is incorporated in the 
FBRI as a potential red flag. 
The scores are assigned based on the percentage of shares owned by the state. For ownership 
of 0-5%, a score of 0 is assigned to the firm. We decided on this restriction since all observed 
 
8 Refer to Appendix M for the complete mapping list. 
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companies are owned by the Norwegian government through the GPFG to a small extent. A 
minor share that is owned by a government through an investment fund that is diversified across 
more than a thousand companies does neither imply close personal ties nor particular interests 
of a government to the investee. For ownership shares between 5-25%, the state can be assumed 
to be a substantial blockholder. Hence, a score of 50 is assigned for companies with state 
ownership in that range. For companies with more than 25% state ownership, a score of 100 is 
assigned as the state would have blocking minority for the most important decisions taking on 
shareholder level in many countries, including the UK and Germany (Goergen et al. 2008:45; 
Mills et al. 2019). Hence, a government owning more than 25% of total shares may well be 
decisive for strategic decisions affecting the long-term success of a company. As a consequence 
of the substantial ownership share, a government is incentivized to interfere in business 
practices to ensure its interests. There is a clear risk that highly entangled ties between the state 
and the firm are established in such cases. 
 Political Exposure 
Political exposure can materialize either when a firm’s owners, its board members, or other 
key employees of a firm hold government, military, or political positions or where such a 
position is held by these individual’s close relatives. Such constellations can, directly or 
indirectly, be leveraged to influence government decisions improperly (TRACE 2019a). Such 
connections do not necessarily signify illegitimate behavior, but when the association with 
government bodies goes beyond what can reasonably be expected within standard business 
practices, it is a red flag calling for closer investigation. 
Political proximity is estimated by identifying the number of politically exposed persons at the 
board level using the PEP indicator from the ORBIS database. Scores are assigned based on 
the total number of PEPs in the firms’ executive and supervisory boards. A score of zero is 
allocated when no politically exposed persons could be identified. Firms with one to three PEPs 
at board level receive a score of 50, and firms with four to six PEPs a score of 75. Firms with 
more than six PEPs are allocated a maximum score of 100. 
 Previous Allegations 
As mentioned in section 3.4.1, it is not straightforward whether previous allegations indicate 
an elevated potential risk of a firm being prospectively corrupt. Enforcement actions can be 
initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and other institutions from signatories of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
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Convention (Sanyal & Samanta 2011:153). Besides cross-border enforcement, domestic 
investigations may also be conducted by national agencies. However, accessing the information 
on state-level inspection has numerous obstacles. The quality and strength of domestic 
enforcement mechanisms are correlated with the corruption risk in a respective country (Anne 
van Aaken 2010:205). The authors show that in countries where corruption is endemic, the 
judiciary may also be distorted or exposed to threats. Moreover, many governments do not 
reveal whom they sanction under criminal law. As a result, the extent of information regarding 
former enforcement cases is incomplete.  
After carefully considering both its advantages and drawbacks, we decided to include both 
international and domestic enforcement cases in our analysis of previous allegations. Cases are 
considered provided that legal enforcement sanctions were undertaken against either the 
corporation or its managers. Actuality of considered cases is ensured by only including 
allegations that occurred over the last five years. A score of 100 is assigned to firms with 
bribery allegations within the last five years, while a score of zero is allocated provided that no 
misconduct was detected. 
We acknowledge that the Previous Allegations variable might be tilted in favor of small firms 
because they are less likely to be investigated by enforcement bodies, as they might not be able 
to bear the cost of a settlement. Part of the fine is usually allocated to the enforcement bodies 
to cover the expenses which can easily be accumulated to a two- or three-digit million-dollar 
figure. However, since the GPFG is mainly invested in large, publicly listed equities, we 
decided to not address this issue through a different weighing of the variable in respect to the 
firm size, since setting weights would be highly discretionary and introduce additional 
complexity to the FBRI. 
 Bribery Prevention 
Even though public reporting on anti-bribery initiatives cannot be equated with actual anti-
bribery performance, it provides an opportunity for companies to focus on their practices and 
drives improvement (Transparency International 2014). We use the methodology of TI’s 
Transparency in Corporate Reporting (TCR) as a benchmark to assess the quality of anti-
corruption initiatives and public disclosure practices. By implementing a set of predefined 
reporting items, the TCR checks the existence of publicly available information on 26 items 
across three dimensions: reporting on anti-corruption programs (1), organizational 
transparency (2), and country-by-country reporting (3). Given the time constraints and the 
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focus on bribery prevention, we focus our investigation on anti-corruption (1) and 
organizational transparency (2) while neglecting country-by-country reporting (3). A concise 
set of six components is created, which are listed in Appendix C. The chosen components are 
considered the most suitable for evaluating the effectiveness of the practices in place to prevent 
bribery. The information is gathered by analyzing the company’s code of conduct, CSR 
reporting, anti-corruption reports, annual reports, and corporate websites. Four of the 
components are scored either with 0 or 1, while two components are given a score of 0, 1, 2, 
or 3, with lower scores indicating worse performance and/or less transparency. The final score, 
which ranges between 0 and 10, is calculated by adding up the scores for the six elements. 
Lastly, the scores are inverted and normalized on a range from 0 to 100 to generate the final 
Bribery Prevention score, with higher scores indicating higher bribery risk.  
 Weight assignment 
The FBRI is calculated as a weighted average of the variable scores. In parallel with its 
underlying variables, the FBRI is scored in a range between 0 and 100. For company i and the 
chosen variables j (with 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6} ), the FBRI is calculated as a linear function of the 
variable weights (𝑤𝑗) and the respective variable scores (𝑣𝑖,𝑗) using formula (i): 
𝐹𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗
6
𝑗=1
𝑣𝑖,𝑗  (i) 
Allocating weights to the variables is a crucial part of building the FBRI, due to its high 
susceptibility not only to the variable scores but also to the assigned weights. Consequently, 
careful consideration is given to the appointment of weights. However, difficulties in 
measuring corruption and the lack of comprehensive empirical studies to quantify the impact 
of different corruption drivers on firm bribery risk hamper an accurate determination of 
weights. 
A firm’s cultural and organizational setup shapes the opportunity, deterrence, and motivation 
to pay bribes from the inside out, and hence, strongly impacts organizations’ tendency for 
respective misconduct. This is supported by Bussmann et al. (2017:271), who find in a survey-
based study that for German companies with a strong compliance system, managers of German 
and Russian subsidiaries do not show significantly different willingness to engage in 
corruption. Nonetheless, recent investigations like the Deutsche Bank scandal in China and 
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Russia9 show that companies behave opportunistically concerning the environment where they 
operate (TRACE 2021). Despite strong anti-corruption policies and compliant behavior in 
domestic low-corruption markets, when exposed to a more corrupt environment, several 
companies have managed to utilize bribes to gain a competitive advantage (Pollack & Allern 
2018:79). Consequently, the accumulated weight of variables measuring the firm-level bribery 
risk is weighted with 40%, closely followed by the country-level risk weight of 35%. The 
remainder of 25% is assigned to the industry-level risk (Table 3).  
The assumptions behind the weight assignment are backed by previous research. Cosenz and 
Noto (2014) apply a dynamic simulation model to research how different assumptions of 
country-level corruption risk and customer composition matter for a company’s tendency to 
pay bribes. They find that both factors have a significant impact on the likelihood to pay bribes 
as well as the size of illicit payments. However, assuming different scenarios, the country-
specific risk level is found to be more important than the customer base composition (Cosenz 
& Noto 2014:247-52), which is in the FBRI indirectly measured by the industry-level risk 
score.  
Within the firm-level risk factors, the variables Ownership Structure and Previous Allegations 
are weighted with 5%, respectively. As discussed before, the previous involvement in bribery 
cases does not necessarily translate into an increased prospective bribery risk. Similarly, 
previous research discusses arguments for and against the assumption that public ownership 
increases firm-level bribery risk (Billon & Gillanders 2016:1076). Since Previous Allegations 
is a binary variable with scores of either 0 or 100 and Ownership Structure can take on three 
values (0, 50, and 100), their respective standard deviations are high. In an attempt to 
counterbalance this, relatively low weights are assigned to the two factors. 
Due to the high relevance of a company’s compliance program (Bussmann et al. 2017:257), 
the Bribery Prevention variable reflecting a company’s disclosures on anti-corruption 
endeavors receives the highest weight among the firm-level variables (Table 3). Finally, 
Political Exposure is assigned half the weight of Bribery Prevention. Although ties to the 
government constitute a relevant red flag for bribery, sound internal controls and compliance 
 
9 On January 8, 2021, Deutsche Bank AG agreed to pay a sum of $122 million to US enforcement bodies DOJ 
and SEC to reach a Deferred Prosecution Agreement. Deutsche Bank was alleged to have bribed officials and 
their close relatives in China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while also offered employment 
opportunities to foreign officials’ relatives in China and Russia. 
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mechanisms like whistleblower protection can mitigate opportunistic behavior (Bussmann et 
al. 2017:217). 
Table 3: Weight assignment across variables 
Risk level 
Aggregated weights by 
risk level 
Variable name Assigned weights 
Country-level 35% Operating Countries 35% 
Industry-level 25% Subsidiary Industries 25% 
Firm level 40% 
Bribery Prevention 20% 
Political Exposure 10% 
Ownership Structure 5% 
Previous Allegations 5% 
4.2.2 Quantitative discrimination of bribery risk across industries 
The approximately 9200 portfolio companies of the GPFG operate in various industries. As 
summarized in section 3.3, specific industry characteristics can lead to different bribery 
opportunities for companies. However, to the best of our knowledge, an indicator that measures 
the differences in bribery risk across industries has not yet been developed. A study focusing 
on the perception of foreign bribery by sector is the survey of the Bribe Payers Index conducted 
by Transparency International in 2011. The survey gathers business executives’ views on the 
likelihood that bribes are paid across 19 different business sectors (Transparency International 
2011:14).  
The OECD Foreign Bribery Report also differentiates industries based on their inherent bribery 
risk based on enforcement cases in the US, UK, and other European countries. In total, 
enforcement data from 427 foreign bribery cases is applied to measure transnational corruption. 
It ranks 14 business sectors based on the total number of firms sanctioned for foreign bribery 
in each sector. The results indicate that two-thirds of the foreign bribery cases occurred in four 
sectors: extraction (19%), construction (15%), transportation (15%), and telecommunication 
(10%).  
As stated in the literature review, both the TI-BPI and the OECD-FBR have shortcomings. 
Since the TI-BPI relies on perception-based measures, its estimates could suffer from 
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subjectivity of the responses and the huge confidence intervals of the results. In addition, given 
that it evaluates the perception of business personnel in 30 different countries, the variation in 
the number and the characteristics of the respondents can lead to further biases. The findings 
of the FBR need to be considered carefully, too. The decisions of the enforcement agencies 
regarding which companies to investigate could introduce a selection bias towards large firms 
and sectors that are perceived as more prone to bribery. 
For the reasons mentioned above, we create an industry bribery risk score (IBRS), which 
aggregates the findings of both reports. These sources complement each other by providing 
both perception-based bribery risk evaluation (BPI) and analysis of enforcement actions 
(OECD-FBR). Both publications rank different business sectors based on how prone they are 
to bribery risk but use different measurement scales and industry classifications. BPI indicates 
elevated bribery risk with higher scores (the maximum score of 10 corresponds with the view 
that companies in that sector never bribe and 0 that they always do). In the FBR, the share of 
enforcement cases for each industry is stated as a percentage of the total number of enforcement 
cases. To aggregate these two sources and to calculate a risk score for each industry, the 
following steps have been applied: 
Step 1: Because the two publications employ different industry classifications, the industries 
in each report are mapped to the twelve industries that we defined (column 1 in Table 4). As 
an illustration, the TI-BPI describes “light manufacturing” and “heavy manufacturing” 
separately, while our chosen industry classification does not distinguish between these sub-
categories. Since the TI-BPI assigned a bribery risk score to both these categories, the average 
of these scores is calculated to arrive at the risk score of the manufacturing sector. Applying 
this approach, a score is assigned to each sector based on the TI-BPI bribery scores (column 2 
in Table 4).  
Step 2: The OECD-FBR evaluates industries based on the share of the enforced cases that 
occurred in a given sector compared to the total number of enforced cases included in the study. 
For example, the extractive industry ranks the highest, given that 19% of all considered foreign 
bribery cases occurred in this sector. 15% of the cases have taken place in the construction 
sector (column 3 in Table 4). However, the OECD-FBR does not take into account the relative 
size of the industries compared to each other. Potentially, more deals, which could be subject 
to bribery, might be conducted in the extractive sector than in construction. If so, the fact that 
15% of the enforcement cases (only 4% lower than in the extractive sector) materialized in 
construction may suggest that this sector is more prone to bribery risk than the extractive 
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industry. Referring to the uniformity assumption of Escresa and Picci (2017:198), the 
underlying assumption is that if corruption risk would be equally distributed across all 
industries, the share of enforcement cases should equate to the share of GDP size of each 
industry. 
Step 3: To account for size when assigning bribery risk to a given sector, the worldwide GDP 
in US dollars per industry is downloaded from the EIKON database (column 4 in Table 4) and 
the relative share of GDP (column 5) calculated for each industry i: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 =
𝐸𝐼𝐾𝑂𝑁 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 
∑ 𝐸𝐼𝐾𝑂𝑁 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗  
12
𝑗=1
       for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ ∩ [1; 12] (ii) 
Step 4: A metric named Enforcement Ratio is created, which divides the share of enforcement 




       for all 𝑖 ∈ ℕ ∩ [1; 12] (iii) 
The uniformity assumption of Escresa and Picci (2017) implies that an Enforcement Ratio 
value larger than one indicates that disproportionately more enforcement cases occurred in the 
sector than expected given its size (column 6 in Table 4). For instance, 15% of the enforcement 
cases occurred in construction, but the sector’s world-level GDP share compared to the total 
world-level GDP is only 4.2%. This indicates that more companies were enforced for bribery 
in the construction industry, as expected given the industry’s size.  
Step 5: Next, using both the average scores for the BPI-TI and the enforcement ratio (columns 
2 and 6 respectively), the scores are expressed as standard deviations from the mean (columns 
7 and 8 in Table 4). Given that TI-BPI indicates lower bribery risk for higher scores, the 
inverted algebraic sign is applied to reverse its scale. Following the example of the TRACE 
Matrix (TRACE 2019b), inputs of different dimensions are normalized into standard deviations 
from mean to align the dimensions for mathematical operations.  
Step 6 & 7: The information of both sources is accumulated by the simple average of the 
standard deviations from mean for each industry in columns 7 and 8. The resulting values in 
column 9 can be interpreted as an accumulated indicator that reflects both information from 
the BPI and the size-adjusted enforcement case data from the FBR. We acknowledge that 
through the accumulation process, information can be lost. For example, by weighing both data 
points equally, it is assumed that both factors are equally important to measure the industry 
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bribery risk. Since we cannot verify whether this assumption is accurate, the described 
calculation can only result in an approximation for differences in bribery risk across industries. 
Therefore, the decision is made not to normalize the values in column 9 on a scale from 0 to 
100 but rather to rank the industries and assign scores with equal intervals, where 0 is allocated 
to the lowest and 100 to the highest rank (column 11). These scores are referred to as the 
Industry Bribery Risk Score (IBRS) in the following sections. 
Table 4: Calculation of the Industry Bribery Risk Score 
 
One should be aware of the drawbacks attached to the above-described approach. Firstly, both 
the data from BPI (2011) and the FBR (2014) are quite old in relative terms. Furthermore, the 
sectoral GDP data for 2019 retrieved from EIKON sums up to 55 trillion USD, while the World 
Bank reported GDP to be at $87.7 trillion that year (World Bank 2021a). We remark that the 
gap might introduce a bias to the results if GDP data of specific sectors are either over- or 
undervalued in EIKON.  
Nevertheless, there are factors in support of the chosen approach. Firstly, the age of the BPI 
report might have a modest effect as perception-based indices tend to change slowly over time 
(Fazekas et al. 2013:3). Furthermore, the time span comprised by the OECD FBR from 1999 
to 2014 is quite long. Hence, the inclusion of cases after 2014 could lead to some variation in 
the results, though it is not expected that the enforcement cases shifted dramatically for the 
industries. This is validated by the TRACE Global Enforcement Report, which summarizes the 
industries that have experienced the most enforcement actions concerning alleged bribery of 
public officials as of 31 December 2020. According to the report, the extractive industry 
represents the highest number of bribery investigations (20%), followed by the construction 
sector with approximately 17% (TRACE 2020b:18).  
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Additionally, the results of the IBRS correspond with previous research on industries of high 
bribery risk. Chan and Owusu (2017:41) argue that the construction sector is one of the most 
corrupt industries, and it also ranks first in our score. Other industries found as corruption-
prone by previous literature like extraction (Kolstad & Wiig 2013), defense (Feinstein et al. 
2011), utilities (Kenny & Søreide 2009), human health (Cohen 2006), and telecommunication 
(Brzić et al. 2021) all have a risk score above average in (column 9, Table 4). 
As an alternative approach to create an indicator of bribery across industries, we aimed to 
utilize the World Bank Enterprise Survey data. The survey of the World bank comprises 13 
items that address the respondent’s experience with bribe paying and gift-giving (World Bank 
2020). We aimed to examine the bribery incidence, which is the percentage of firms that are 
requested to pay a bribe at least once, to discriminate bribery risk between industries. However, 
the industry segmentation available in the data lacks granularity. Most firms are only referred 
to an industry using a two-digit SIC-Code, rendering it impossible to distinguish between 
defense and other heavy manufacturing producers, for instance. Consequently, we refrain from 
the application of the Enterprise Survey data. This underpins the concurrent research gap in the 
area of industry-level bribery risk, as outlined in section 3.5. As a result, other recent 
publications, as from Li, S. (2019:55) and Kravtsova and Oshchepkov (2019:16), were also 
constrained to the BPI data. 
By considering both perception-based and enforcement case data, the limited available data on 
industry-level bribery risk is utilized. The chosen methodology entails a ranking of industries 
present in the GPFG’s portfolio with respect to their inherent bribery risk, which is used to 
discriminate investments in respect to their bribery risk based on the industries they operate in. 
4.2.3 Drawing a sample 
The FBRI is employed to analyze whether the bribery risk of the listing country, as applied in 
the comparison across funds, is an accurate measure for a firm’s actual bribery risk. Since it 
requires extensive manual data collection, calculating the FBRI scores for all equities of the 
GPFG is not feasible. Thus, a sample is drawn to examine a subset of firms in detail. Given the 
time constraints, the sample is limited to n = 80 companies. We decided to draw 20 companies 
from each of the four TRACE country risk categories represented in the portfolio (Figure 4). 
This ensures that firms in the sample represent the full range of country risk levels since firms 
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with very low and moderate risk categories are overrepresented in the GPFG portfolio with 
67,9% and 22,6% compared to only 1.3% of equities in the high category10. 
Additionally, systematic differences in industry-level bribery risk across the four subsamples 
could bias the analysis due to the confined sample size. For instance, if the 20 selected 
companies from the high-country risk category would turn out by chance to operate in high-
risk industries like construction or defense, while the companies drawn from the very low 
country risk category operate in low-risk industries like manufacturing, differences in the FBRI 
might result from sample-specific differences in the industry. To limit this effect, 10 out of the 
20 companies of each subsample are randomly selected from industries with increased and 
moderate industry-specific risk (see Figure 4). Thereby, the sample can still reflect eventual 
systematic differences in the industry between the country-risk categories to a certain degree. 
All industries with an average standard deviation from mean larger than zero (column 9, Table 
4) present an increased risk, as a positive value reflects an aggregated risk score above average. 
Analogously, all industries with a respective negative value are clustered in the moderate 
industry risk category. 
 
                    Figure 4: Drawing the sample for analyzing the second hypothesis 
The ten companies within each of the eight resulting clusters are randomly drawn using the 
statistical software R11. To estimate the firm-level bribery risk, the FBRI score is calculated for 
all firms in the sample. For testing the second hypothesis, these scores are compared to the 
 
10 For a detailed explanation of the clustering of countries into different risk categories in the TRACE Matrix refer 
to section 5.1.2. 
11 See Appendix D for the exhaustive list of the sample companies. 
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firms’ listing country-level risk scores. In addition, average FBRI scores are calculated for the 
different country level risk categories.  
4.2.4 OLS regression, ANOVA, and Welch t-test 
For examining the capability of listing country risk scores (LCRS) to explain firm level risk 
measured by the FBRI, a univariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is applied with 
FBRI being the independent variable. We chose an OLS regression over correlations since 
regressions allow deeper analyses through the provision of error terms. Thereby, the strength 
of the linear relation between both variables, as well as explained variation in FBRI can be 
analyzed. The underlying regression function can be written as shown in formula (iv): 
𝐹𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 (iv) 
To test different relationships, we also compute an exponential and third-degree polynomial 
regression. We do not include control variables like the country or industry of the particular 
firm, as the FBRI is a function of these variables and thus, inappropriate as controls. The 
objective of this exercise is to identify whether the listing country bribery risk is an appropriate 
direct estimator of the firm bribery risk, resulting from these variables. We do not aim to 
analyze within-industry or -country variations explained by the LCRS, but rather the general 
explanatory power when combining different factors affecting the bribery risk at the firm level, 
reflected by the FBRI. Therefore, we did not include controls in our regression. 
Listing country risk scores might explain differences in firm-level risk better for very low or 
high countries than for other categories. Aiming to analyze respective variations, the average 
FBRI scores are calculated for each of the four country-risk categories high, moderate, low, 
and very low. As a first step, an ANOVA test is applied to test whether the differences in group 
means are jointly significant. ANOVA produces the F-statistic, which compares the amount of 
systematic variance in the data to the amount of unsystematic variance. Since ANOVA is an 
omnibus test, it tests the overall effect (Field et al. 2012:375). Consequently, it does not provide 
specific information about the differences within the groups, or the direction of differences in 
mean. The Welch t-test is applied to test between which of the various pairs of means the 
difference is significant.  
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Both the Welch t-test and the ANOVA, being parametric tests,12 rely on a set of assumptions. 
The assumptions of parametric tests, described by Field et al. (2012:168), and the statistical 
tests used to assess the validity of these assumptions are summarized using Table 5 below. The 
results of testing the first two assumptions are detailed in Appendix E, which shows that neither 
assumption can be rejected. Since the FBRI is a numerical variable with a finite scale between 
0 and 100, the third assumption is satisfied. Independence is also achieved because the firms 
can be assumed to be independent of each other and are randomly selected. 
Table 5: Parametric test assumptions 




The scores in the sample are compared to a normally distributed set of 
scores with the same mean and standard deviation. If the test is non-
significant (p>0.05), the distribution of the sample is not significantly 




It tests the null hypothesis that the variances in the different groups are 
equal. If the test is non-significant (p>0.05), one cannot reject that the 
variances are equal and the assumption is tenable. 
Interval data NA Data point values should be numerical variables. 
Independence NA The variables for different groups should be independent of each other. 
4.3 The Fama-French five-factor model plus Momentum 
This section outlines the methodology for analyzing the financial returns of companies 
identified under Hypothesis II as high and modest bribery risk firms. We examine whether the 
Norwegian Pension fund previously benefitted from being invested in the 20 firms with the 
highest and lowest FBRI scores respectively, in terms of abnormal returns. Since financial 
theory is not the focus of this thesis, the technical background of the applied model is explained 
in brevity. 
Financial theory argues that additional returns always come at the expense of additional risk 
(Sharpe 1966:119). Plenty of models were created over time to explain how risk and return 
should be considered in rational investment decisions and what type of risk is relevant for 
explaining returns (Markowitz 1999). Fama and French found empirical evidence that five 
factors are capable of explaining variations in stock returns (Fama & French 2015). Carhart 
(1997) suggested already in the 90s that a momentum factor systematically affects stock prices. 
 
12 A parametric test uses statistical distributions like the t-distribution, and for data to be parametric certain 
assumptions must be true (Field 2012:167). 
13 This assumption is only required by the ANOVA test since the Welch-test does not assume equal variances. 
42 
Previous empirical studies showed that extending the Fama-French factors by a Momentum 
variable increases the model’s predictions of historic returns, although the importance of the 
factors also varies over time (Arnott et al. 2019:24; Gupta & Kelly 2019:33; Tai 2003:382). 
The six factors are defined by Fama and French (2015) as: 
• SMB: Small minus Big. Indicates the delta returns of the smallest 30% of firms to the 
largest 30% on a market. Size is measured as market capitalization. 
• HML: High minus Low. Indicates the delta returns of the 30% of firms with the highest 
Book-to-Market Ratio to the 30% with the lowest ratio on a market. The Book-to-
Market Ratio is measured as book value of a firm’s equity divided by the market value. 
• RMW: Robust minus Weak. Indicates the delta returns of the 30% of firms with the 
highest profitability to the 30% with the lowest profitability on a market. Profitability 
is measured as the earnings before taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBTDA) 
divided by the book equity. 
• CMA: Conservative minus Aggressive. Indicates the delta returns of the 30% of firms 
with the lowest investments to the 30% with the highest investments on a market. 
Investments are measured as the relative change in a firm’s total assets. 
• MOM: Momentum. Indicates the delta returns of the 30% of firms with the highest 
returns in the last period to the 30% with the highest returns in the last period on a 
market. 
• 𝑟𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓: The excess return of the market, that is the market returns less the return of a 
risk-free asset. It indicates the financial returns of the overall market. Firms that 
correlate strongly with the market have a higher risk than those more robust towards 
external shocks than the market. 
The consequent multivariate regression can be written as shown in formula (v): 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖(𝑟𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴 + 𝑚𝑖𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 𝑒𝑖 (v) 
Provided the alpha is found to be significantly different from zero, an abnormal return is 
indicated by the model. For a significantly positive (negative) alpha, returns are higher (lower) 
than the risk factors would suggest. Such a return is not explained by the risk factors and thus, 
is considered as an abnormal return (Jensen 1968:394). To analyze the returns from high- and 
low-risk firms separately, the Fama-French five-factor model plus Momentum, as written in 
Formula (v), is applied on monthly returns over a period of ten years, from 2010 until 2019. 
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For the independent variables, the FTSE All-World Equity is used as the market portfolio 𝑟𝑀, 
as it represents a globally diversified index of equities and is the benchmark index of the GPFG. 
The 1-month US treasury bill is considered as the risk-free rate 𝑟𝑓, since its volatility, market, 
and inflation risk can be assumed to be negligibly low (Mukherji 2011:75). 
To distinguish returns of high and low bribery risk companies, two portfolios High (H) and 
Low (L) are constructed. Each portfolio consists of the top and bottom quartile of our 80 sample 
firms following their FBRI score. Thus, Portfolio H includes the 20 companies with the highest 
FBRI scores, indicating elevated bribery risk (see Appendix L). On the contrary, Portfolio L 
includes the 20 companies with the lowest FBRI scores, indicating modest bribery risk. Each 
portfolio is created by weighing the equities proportionally to their respective weights in the 
GPFG over the time span from 2010 to 2019. Thereby, we replicate the historic adjustments of 
these equities in the GPFG portfolio. The weights are calculated by accessing the historic 
portfolio composition from the NBIM website for each year. 
The analysis is divided into two parts. At first, a long-short portfolio is examined, which buys 
portfolio L and shorts portfolio H. By doing so, the return of buying the stocks with low bribery 
risk and shorting those of high bribery risk is mimicked. Afterward, returns of portfolios H and 
L are regressed on the Fama-French model separately. 
As the independent variable, the excess returns of portfolios H and L are applied for the 
separated analysis of the two portfolios. Excess returns are a different concept than abnormal 
returns. They describe the returns of an asset that exceed the return of the risk-free rate (𝑟𝑓). 
For portfolio L, (H) the dependent variable is thus expressed as 𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝑓 (𝑟𝐻 − 𝑟𝑓). In contrast, 
the returns of the long-short portfolio are not subtracted by the risk-free rate, since the 
difference in excess returns equals the difference in absolute returns of the two portfolios: 
(𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝑓) − (𝑟𝐻 − 𝑟𝑓) = 𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝐻 (vi) 
Finally, the long-short portfolio, portfolio L, and H are constructed assigning equal weights. 
These portfolios do not mimic the GPFG but rather show the differences in returns for H and 




The data collection process consists of three separate parts. Firstly, we access information 
regarding the portfolio of the GPFG and the benchmark SWFs is. The data is used to compare 
the funds’ bribery risk exposure. The second segment supports the calculation of FBRI scores 
by gathering data ofnthe underlying variables. Finally, data of the historic returns is collected 
that is used to calculate the abnormal returns. 
5.1 SWF portfolios and the TRACE Matrix 
5.1.1 Portfolio data of SWFs 
We downloaded data describing the equity investments of the SWFs from their respective 
websites. The datasets contain the following information for each equity: name of the firm, 
listing country, and market value of the investment in local currency. Additionally, the data set 
of the GPFG includes the incorporation country, industry classification, as well as voting and 
ownership share. In some cases, the data is only available in textual format, so the statistical 
software R is used to prepare the data for analysis.14 
5.1.2 TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix 
The TRACE Matrix aims to provide a resource for quantifying bribery risk. The Matrix is 
accessed by downloading the 2019 TRACE Matrix Information Pack, which is publicly 
available through the website of TRACE International. The collection outlines the analytical 
model used to produce the Matrix, describes the methodology regarding the data collection 
procedure and lists the underlying data sources. The Matrix employs on average 52 datapoints 
per country to assign an overall bribery risk score for 194 nations. Each score ranges between 
zero and one hundred with lower values indicating lower bribery risk and is calculated as the 
weighted average of four separate risk domains. The four domains, together with the overall 
bribery score are summarized using Table 6 below. Analyzing each domain separately can 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the particular aspects of the countries’ bribery risk 
profiles (TRACE 2019b:1). As mentioned before, TRACE clusters countries in five different 
bribery risk categories as shown in Appendix A. 
  
 
14 For information on the availability of the R script, please refer to Appendix N. 
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Weight Description of the risk domain 
Opportunity 26 40% 
Concerns the immediate relation between a company 
and public officials 
Deterrence 15 15% 
Considers both formal enforcement mechanisms and less 
formal ways in which bribery is discouraged 
Transparency 12 22.5% Addresses the accessibility of public sector information 






Represents the country-level contributors of business 
bribery risk 
5.2 Firm-level corruption risk indicator 
As detailed in the introductory chapters, previous research shows that besides country-specific 
factors, industry-, and firm-level characteristics further influence the risk of being involved in 
bribery. To account for these additional risk components, the FBRI is constructed. The 
indicator is intended to capture red flags, i.e., certain facts that can signal a heightened risk of 
public bribery. It utilizes a set of databases as well as publicly available information. Bureau 
van Dijk’s Orbis database is applied to gather information on subsidiary locations, business 
sectors, ownership structure, and the presence of politically exposed persons on a company’s 
management level. Corporate websites are accessed to collect information about governance, 
compliance, and transparency. 
5.2.1 Data collection of FBRI variables 
 Operating Countries and Subsidiary Industries 
A dataset containing all subsidiaries, their country of operation, as well as the primary business 
activity through a 3-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, are downloaded from 
the Orbis database for each firm in the sample. All companies are considered as subsidiaries of 
which the parent company is the ultimate global owner. This means that it has a direct or 
indirect majority of voting shares or contractual-based dominant influence. On average, the 
firms in the sample conduct their operations in eight countries and across four out of the 12 
predefined industries (Table 7).  
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the sample companies 
 Min Max Mean Standard deviation 
# Operating countries per 
firm 
1 77 8.2 13.9 
# Unique business sectors 
per firm 
1 9 4.23 2.55 
# different 3-digit SIC codes 
per firm 
1 63 10.8 13.2 
While the country information is available for almost all subsidiaries, around 15% of the 
subsidiaries have no SIC Code assigned. The missing SIC Codes are looked up manually by 
the authors using additional private company databases like Dun & BroadStreet Business 
Directory, Bloomberg, Crunchbase, PitchBook, and websites of the respective companies. 
Subsidiaries for which the operating industry could not be determined are neglected in the 
further analysis. As this share is less than 5% of the total subsidiaries, the impact of those 
missing values is estimated to be negligible. The results of analyzing the collected data of 
subsidiary countries and sectors are outlined in Appendices F and G. 
 Ownership structure 
Information regarding the firms’ shareholder structure is accessed using the Orbis database. 
Orbis gathers its data for Ownership Structure from several sources, including stock exchanges 
and other data providers like Factset and WhoOwnsWhom.  
Orbis states direct and indirect ownership per shareholder data. Direct ownership describes 
when a shareholder invested directly in the subsidiary, while indirect ownership includes 
ownership through another company or holding. The latter is only considered if the ultimate 
shareholder has a controlling influence on the holding, which owns the given company. 
Public ownership is determined by considering both direct and indirect government ownership 
cumulatively. For instance, following Orbis, the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt is 
invested in Egyptian Financial & Industrial Company SAE through three fully owned corporate 
vehicles: Metallurgical Industries Holding Company (27.14%), Private Insurance Fund for the 
Government Sector's Employees (12.26%) and the National Authority for Social Insurance 
(11.79%). Since the Egyptian government controls all three organizations, the total indirect 
ownership is calculated as the sum of all three investment vehicles’ shares, which is 51.19%. 
An overview of all firms in the sample with state ownership is presented in Appendix H. 
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 Political exposure 
Political proximity and government connections are estimated by identifying the number of 
politically exposed persons at the board level. A comprehensive list of the firms’ board of 
directors was accessed through the Orbis database. Orbis’ PEP indicator reveals whether the 
name of a person in the board is referred to as politically exposed in their database. Besides 
politicians, their relatives and close personal contacts are also considered to be politically 
exposed according to this procedure (Bureau van Dijk 2021). The data suffers from the 
shortcoming that managers with similar or identical names to politicians are highlighted as 
PEPs as well. Hence, some of the individuals labeled as PEP in Orbis can be assumed to be 
false positives, meaning that they are not politically exposed in fact. This explains why only 
nine out of 80 companies in the sample did not have any PEPs on board level. We acknowledge 
this shortcoming of the data by assigning increasing scores for a higher number of PEPs. Even 
though the PEP indicator in Orbis is an imperfect measure, we assumed that a larger number 
of people marked as PEPs translates into closer political connections on average, given that the 
possibility that one or some of them are indeed politically exposed is higher. An overview of 
the number of PEPs on board level for all sample companies is provided in Appendix I. 
 Previous allegations 
The TRACE Compendium database is used to identify cross-border anti-bribery actions. The 
database provides detailed enforcement reports on bribery involvement of government officials 
across international borders. Sources like the Wall Street Journal Risk and Compliance Journal, 
national databases such as the one from the UK Serious Fraud Office, and newspaper articles 
are accessed to identify previous cases of domestic bribery allegations. An overview of all 
considered bribery cases, including the sources and a short description of each case, can be 
reviewed in Appendix J. 
 Bribery Prevention 
Corporate governance and transparency are assessed by evaluating the information disclosed 
on compliance programs. The anti-corruption effort score is compiled by utilizing publicly 
available information published on the companies’ corporate websites. The data collection is 
carried out by performing a systematic review of annual reports, code of ethics and business 
conducts, social responsibility reports, anti-corruption programs, and whistleblowing policies. 
Although a standardized catalog of six items (Appendix C) is applied to examine a company’s 
anti-corruption endeavors, the evaluation of qualitative data is affected by a certain degree of 
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subjectivity. Although both authors conducted the analysis independently, subjectivity errors 
cannot be entirely excluded. An overview of the examined items and their fulfillment for each 
firm is depicted in Appendix K. 
5.2.2 Industry GDP size 
Information regarding world-level GDP sectoral data is accessed through the EIKON database. 
EIKON classifies the industries into numerous sub-categories. These sub-sectors are 
aggregated to fit the 12 sectors as defined under section 4.2.2 to calculate the total GDP figures 
for each industry. 
5.3 Fama-French factors and returns 
Historic returns underlying the variables SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, and MOM are retrieved 
from Kenneth French’s website (French 2021). The provided data comprises different 
individual and accumulated markets like emerging and developing countries but is not 
available on a global level. However, as firms from emerging and developed economies are 
considered in portfolios L and H, the global Fama-French factors are approximated. Therefore, 
factors for emerging and developed markets are weighted annually by the share of the global 
GDP in current US dollar. The global GDP split by emerging and developed markets from 
2010 until inclusive 2019 is accessed through the World Bank Databank (World Bank 2021b). 
The historical returns of the 1-month US treasury bill for the returns of the risk-free asset 𝑟𝑓 
are also retrieved from French’s website. Being the benchmark index of the GPFG, the FTSE 
All-World Equity is preferred as an approximation of the market return 𝑟𝑀. Its historical returns 
are retrieved via Refinitiv EIKON since French provides a different market return 𝑟𝑀, that 
combines returns of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ equities.  
We retrieved historic monthly returns of the 40 companies included in the two portfolios H and 
L from EIKON. Some of the equities were not listed at the beginning of 2010. In consequence, 
we consider only available stock returns to calculate the weighted and unweighted average 
returns of the portfolios. Additionally, the Chinese company Bestsun Energy Co Ltd from 
China has missing stock returns over a period from April until September 2015. Returns in this 
period are neglected from determining the portfolio returns and not set equal to zero. 
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6 Analysis  
This chapter outlines the results of our empirical analysis. First, we present the findings related 
to the first hypothesis, which examines country-level bribery risk solely. Since the three funds 
are all globally diversified and have little difference in bribery risk of their domestic countries, 
we expect not to observe considerable differences in bribery risk exposure among the 
portfolios. The second hypothesis is targeted at the relation between country-level and firm-
specific bribery risk within the GPFG portfolio. Therefore, the analysis expands its scope by 
considering industry- and firm-level bribery risk factors besides country-level aspects. The 
FBRI is used as an approximation for the firm-specific bribery risk, as it comprises all three 
levels of risk determinants. Finally, we outline the results of the Fama-French model on the 
historic returns of the firms with high and low bribery risk for testing Hypothesis III. 
6.1 Country-level bribery risk comparison 
This section presents the results of the analysis to examine the first hypothesis, in which the 
country-level bribery risk of the GPFG is compared to a peer group of three other sovereign 
wealth funds, consisting of the Dutch ABP, the Superannuation Fund of New Zealand, and the 
Alaskan APFC. 
Hypothesis I: The country-specific bribery risk exposure in the GPFG is not systematically 
different than of its peer sovereign wealth funds. 
6.1.1 Comparison of weighted average risk scores 
As a first step, a weighted average bribery risk score is calculated for each fund. The score is 
determined based on the TRACE overall bribery risk score of each investment’s primary listing 
country. As each portfolio consists of a multitude of equities with different investment 
volumes, each equity is weighted with its investment market value (IMV). Consequently, the 
Total Risk Score (TRS) is calculated by considering each investment i, with I representing the 









𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐸 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖  (vii) 
Besides using the total overall bribery risk score of the TRACE Matrix, as depicted in the above 
formula, weighted risk scores are also determined using the TRACE domains Deterrence, 
Opportunity, Oversight, and Transparency. Figure 5 summarizes this comparison across the 
50 
funds. The red dashed lines imply the average risk scores for the given dimension of the four 
portfolios. 
 
Figure 5: Weighted risk scores based on the TRACE total risk score and the domains 
Considering the weighted risk scores, the ABP constitutes the riskiest portfolio. It has the 
highest country bribery risk for the Total Risk Score and each of the four domains. Apart from 
the Transparency domain, both the ABP and the APFC have consistently higher average scores 
than the GPFG. In addition, the weighted scores for the GPFG lie close to the average scores 
for each dimension, highlighted by the dashed red line. 
However, the differences in risk scores among the domains are prominent. The average 
Deterrence score systematically exceeds all other dimensions across all funds. In contrast to 
the Oversight and Opportunity domain scores, which have values of around 20 on average, the 
gap between Deterrence and Transparency is salient. For instance, the Deterrence score for NZ 
Super (28.9) is almost twice as high as its Transparency score (14.6). For the GPFG, this 
difference accounts for around 13 points. The implications are twofold. The very low 
Transparency score implies that investments are on average listed in countries where 
information about governmental institutions and domestic civil services is easily accessible to 
the public. On the other hand, the higher Deterrence score signals that anti-bribery enforcement 
and social condemning of corruption in the invested countries are less effective. This is 
important for the bribery risk of a country because reporting about and passing anti-bribery 
laws is of little effectiveness when laws are not appropriately enforced (Søreide 2014:9-10). 
Since this disparity occurs for each fund, it is an interesting finding in itself but does not imply 
elevated bribery risk of the GPFG compared to its peers. 
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The results of the robustness check summarized in Figure 6, underpin the finding that the 
weighted country-risk score of the GPFG is close to the average of its peer funds. Although the 
absolute levels of average scores vary across the indicators, the relative locations of the funds’ 
bribery scores to each other are very similar to the findings of the TRACE Matrix. It’s 
important to note that since all sources rely on perception-based information about corruption 
and partially utilize the same sources, perceptual biases from the self-fulfilling effect of these 
reports cannot be completely mitigated. However, other challenges, like discretionary 
decisions in aggregating data and the large confidence intervals of estimates, can be mitigated 
by applying other indices based on different methodologies. 
 
Figure 6: Weighted country-level bribery risk scores robustness check 
6.1.2 Comparison of upwards outliers 
Analyzing the weighted average scores can be misleading. By solely focusing on averages, an 
elevated risk posed by the small number of high-risk investments could be negated by the vast 
number of low-risk equities. Hence, in a more granular analysis, all equities in countries 
categorized by TRACE as high bribery risk environments are compared across the funds. 
Figure 7 depicts the portfolio share of investments in those countries across the different funds. 
The GPFG has the largest proportion of high-risk investments both when the number of firms 
and the portfolio value share are examined. With 1.3% of equities (119 of 9202 firms) invested 
in high-risk countries, the Norwegian pension fund has 2.6 times more firms in those countries 
compared to the ABP, which represents the second highest share of high-risk firms with 0.5%. 
The other two funds mark the bottom line with only 0.1%. Analog inferences arise from the 
portfolio value share of high-country risk investments, although the relative differences 
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between the GPFG and the ABP and APFC are less severe. This implies that the GPFG’s 
investments in high bribery risk countries are smaller relative to its total portfolio than for its 
peers from Alaska and the Netherlands. 
 
Figure 7: Share of investments in high bribery risk countries across funds 
When considering the absolute amount of US-Dollar invested in equities listed in high-risk 
countries, the disparity between the GPFG and its peers becomes even larger, given that the 
total AUM is by far the highest for the Norwegian fund. The GPFG is invested in 119 firms 
from high-risk countries, whereas ABP includes only 18, APFC nine, and NZ Super four 
respective equities. The total market value of these investments stated in Million US-Dollar is 
depicted for each fund in Figure 8.15 The $1.3 million equity value of the NZ Super seems 
negligible in comparison with the GPFG’s value of around $1.3 billion. Relative to the other 
portfolios, the amount of capital flowing into firms from high bribery risk countries is 
outstanding for the GPFG. This suggests a higher exposure of bribery risk in the Norwegian 
oil fund under the condition that the listing country bribery risk is an appropriate indicator for 
the actual bribery risk of the firms. Identifying whether this assumption is valid is the subject 
of the analysis in the next section. 
 




Figure 8: Total investment value (Million USD) in high-risk countries 
6.2 Firm-level bribery risk analysis 
This section presents the results of the analysis which examines the second hypothesis. By 
applying the FBRI, the firm-level bribery risk is determined for 80 sample firms from the 
GPFG and compared with their country-level risk through univariate regressions and pairwise 
t-tests.  
Hypothesis II: Within the GPFG’s portfolio, firms from countries with high bribery risk are 
subject to high bribery risk at the firm level. 
6.2.1 Country- and firm-level bribery risk  
After randomly drawing a sample of 80 companies from the GPFG portfolio as specified in 
section 4.2.3, the FBRI is calculated for each firm. Therefore, information is gathered about 
the six variables underlying the indicator as outlined in the Data section under 5.2.1. The 
resulting variable scores are multiplied with their respective weights. Appendix L lists all 
sample companies with the resulting scores of the six variables and FBRI scores, together with 
their respective listing country and country risk category. Bestsun Energy Co Ltd from China 
tops the list with an FBRI score of 68.15, while the lowest score of 19.77 is assigned to 
PolyNovo Ltd from Australia. 
To examine the explanatory power of the listing country score for firm-level bribery risk, a 
simple univariate regression with the FBRI as the independent variable is applied. A linear 
relation is assumed for the base model, while an exponential and third-degree polynomial 
regression is used to test for nonlinear relations. The outcome is depicted in Figure 9, while 
statistics of the regression results are shown in Table 8. 
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In the linear model, the upward sloping regression line indicates that higher listing country risk 
scores generally signal higher FBRI scores in the sample. This finding is supported by its 
coefficient of 0.216 being significantly larger than zero at the 1% significance level. On the 
other hand, the high standard error of around 9.5 paired with the low R² term of 0.14 indicates 
that country risk predicts firm-specific risk with low precision. Also, the corresponding, weakly 
positive correlation coefficient of 0.37 underlines that the relation of country-level bribery risk 
and firm-level risk is generally positive but lacks precision. 
The exponential regression describes a function moving nearby and almost parallel to the linear 
regression and even reveals the same three-digit R² value. Note that the stated standard error in 
the regression table is lower than for the other two regressions since the listing country risk 
scores are regressed on the log FBRI values, which are less dispersed in absolute terms. 
Consequently, low standard errors do not indicate enhanced precision for explaining the FBRI 
values for the exponential regression. 
 Similarly, the third-degree polynomial achieves only a slightly improved coefficient of 
determination of 0.15. Since the difference is marginal, this is likely to be sample-specific and 
does not support a polynomial relation between listing country-level bribery risk and FBRI. 
Generally spoken, all applied models lack precision and come along with a fairly low R² term, 
although indicating a positive relationship between country and firm-level risk.  
 
Figure 9: Scatterplot and regression models 
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Table 8: Results of OLS regression 
 
To analyze the differences between firms of different country-level risk categories in more 
detail, average FBRI scores are calculated for the four TRACE country-level risk categories. 
The mean values indicated as red dots in Figure 10, consistently decrease in country-level 
bribery risk. Firms listed in high bribery risk countries have the highest mean of approximately 
50, while the lowest FBRI mean of 39 prevails in the very low category. This is in line with the 
positive correlation between listing country score and FBRI as found in the linear regression.  
Figure 10: Violin plots depicting the distribution of the FBRI scores 
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An ANOVA test, estimating the differences in means across the four categories, delivers an F-
test result of 4.438. Thus, the test suggests significant differences in the mean at any 
conventional confidence level. Since ANOVA tests fail to provide insights about the direction 
of deviations within the groups, the distribution of the FBRI scores within the risk categories 
is further analyzed.  
The calculated distribution of FBRI scores for the different groups is depicted using violin plots 
in Figure 10. A violin plot can be considered a combination of the box plot and the kernel 
density plot. It is often used to compare the distribution of a given variable across different 
categories. Its biggest advantage is that it shows the entire distribution of the data. The shape 
of the violin plots in Figure 10 suggests that the differences in group means are not driven by 
upwards outliers among high country risk firms, but rather by a larger concentration of values 
at a moderately elevated score level of around 55. The scatter plot in Figure 9 already 
demonstrated that firms from lower risk countries also have high FBRI scores. However, their 
FBRI scores are more dispersed compared to high country risk firms and more firms have 
relatively low values.  
Moreover, the average FBRI scores in the moderate, low, and very low categories move in a 
narrow range (between 39 and 44), compared to the salient 50.24 mean of high-country risk 
firms. The conducted Welch t-test supports these findings. Its results, summarized in Table 9, 
point out significant differences within the mean scores between firms from high country risk 
and the other three risk categories at the 5% and 1% levels. However, the differences comparing 
the group means between the other risk categories are not statistically significant. This points 
out that companies from high-risk countries have a systematically higher FBRI score, while 
the country level risk for companies from moderate-, low-, and very low-risk countries do not 
deviate significantly from the firm-specific bribery risk measured by the FBRI. 
Table 9: Welch t-test results comparing the average FBRI scores between the groups 
Country-level bribery risk 
category 1 
Country-level bribery risk 
category 2 
P-Value Significance 
High Moderate 0.047 ** (at 5% level) 
High Low 0.003 *** (at 1% level) 
High Very low 0.000 *** (at 1% level) 
Moderate Low 0.427 not significant 
Moderate Very low 0.154 not significant 
Low Very low 0.485 not significant 
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6.2.2 Country-level bribery risk and firm-level risk determinants 
 
Some of the six variables constituting the FBRI correlate stronger with the country bribery risk 
score than others. Analyzing which risk determinants correlate with the country-level risk 
provides better insights about what the country-level risk can tell us about the firm-level risk. 
Figure 11 summarizes the correlation coefficients and thus the direction of the relationship 
between the variables and the country-level bribery score. Positive correlations are displayed 
in blue and negative in red colors. The correlation of all FBRI risk determinants is weak. No 
risk determinant seems to be accurately explained by the country-risk score when assuming a 
linear relation, which could be assumed for correlation coefficients of 0.5 or higher. To identify 
those risk determinants that led to the jump between moderate and high-country risk firms, the 
four risk determinants with a positive, but weak correlation coefficient are analyzed in the 
following paragraphs.16 
Operating Country scores are summarized by the TRACE risk categories in Figure 12. The 
error bars show the standard deviation from the mean for each group. When looking at the 
average values, firms listed in high-risk countries clearly score the highest. This suggests that, 
within our sample, the three most risky operating countries of firms from high-risk listing 
countries are on average at higher risk than those of firms from low-risk listing countries. On 
the other hand, the standard deviation of the scores shows differences between the groups. The 
scores of high-risk countries are more clustered around the mean, while the data is more spread 
out for the remaining groups. Given that the Operating Country variable is weighted with 35% 
 
16 We also analyzed the relation between the country-level bribery risk and the Subsidiary Industries and Previous 
Allegations variable but could not find any meaningful results explaining the jump from moderate to high. 
Consequently, only the remaining four variables are presented in detail for brevity reasons.  
Figure 11: Correlations of country bribery risk scores and risk determinants 
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within the FBRI risk factors, it can be concluded that it contributes to the jump of average FBRI 
score between moderate- and high-risk groups.  
 
Figure 12: Average TRACE scores of the three riskiest operating countries 
Political connections with the economy are an important contributor to exercise political 
influence in corporations, especially in emerging markets (Li, M. H. et al. 2018:176). Since 
emerging markets tend to have higher risk scores in corruption indices like the TRACE Matrix, 
it is not surprising that a positive correlation between the listing-country risk and the PEP score 
is identified. However, when analyzing the average number of PEPs in the supervisory and 
executive boards of the sample firms, firms listed in high-risk countries do not engage more 
politically exposed board members than firms from other categories (Figure 13). Although a 
stepwise increase in political exposure is observable from the very low to moderate category, 
the average PEPs in firms with high country risk is clearly below this value. The Italian bank 
Banco BPM Spa had the highest number of PEPs (16) among its board members, although 
listed in a country with low bribery risk. Therefore, in our sample, firms with high country-
level risk are not observed to have closer ties to politics, measured by the number of PEPs on 
board level, than firms in the lower listing country risk categories.  
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Figure 13: Political Exposure per country-level risk category 
A total of six items are evaluated to assess the quality of the firms’ compliance systems in place 
to inhibit bribery (detailed in Appendix K). Figure 14 depicts the average Bribery Prevention 
scores by country-level risk categories, whereas black dots designate each observation in the 
sample. The results imply that the scores range on a broad scale for each category, but firms 
from high-risk countries clearly have the highest average score. However, firms from high-risk 
countries with competent compliance programs can be observed, as well as firms from low-
risk countries with inadequate programs. 
 
Figure 14: Average Bribery Prevention score by risk category 
The underlying items used to conduct the Bribery Prevention score are further analyzed. Figure 
15 illustrates that firms from high-risk countries perform worse across all surveyed items. Item 
1 assesses whether a firm publicly commits to be compliant with anti-corruption laws. This 
adherence can be included in the Code of Ethics, Business Conduct, or sustainability and 
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annual reports. As opposed to companies from very low- and low-risk countries, of which 85% 
officially consent to anti-bribery legislation, only 45% of firms from high-risk countries do so. 
In addition, item 3 describes that merely 15% of these companies have an anti-corruption 
program in place for their directors and employees. Firms with robust compliance systems 
implemented a comprehensive anti-corruption policy with frequent training for employees and 
suppliers. Item 4 reveals that only 40% of the firms with high country risk have a policy in 
place on gifts and hospitality. Furthermore, a large proportion of firms listed in high-risk 
countries lack an adequate and well-functioning whistleblowing policy. Various firms provide 
no whistleblowing channel for their employees at all. In some cases, the channel set up to report 
illegal acts or unethical behavior does not provide anonymity and protection against retaliation. 
All in all, firms listed in high-risk countries report less sufficient compliance programs than 
firms listed in countries with lower-level bribery risk. 
 
Figure 15: Underlying items for Bribery Prevention score 
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Information describing the Ownership Structure of the firms is gathered for all firms in the 
sample, and risk scores are assigned based on the state ownership share. Figure 16 depicts the 
proportional share of firms where at least 5% of the shares are owned by a government entity. 
Within our sample, eight out of the 20 firms (40%) listed in high-risk countries while seven 
companies from moderate country-risk (35%) are owned by the state. Analogously, this listed 
proportion is 20% for firms in low-risk and 5% for companies listed in very low-risk countries. 
This implies a continuous increase of state ownership with higher country-level bribery risk. 
 
Figure 16: Proportion of firms with at least 5% state ownership  
6.3 Analysis of historical returns 
As the managing body of the GPFG, Norges Bank is mandated to sustainably create financial 
value for the Norwegian people, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the fund. Therefore, 
societally relevant ESG aspects like corruption risk must be considered and balanced with 
financial interests when taking an investment decision. To examine if the GPFG historically 
benefitted from being invested in firms with elevated bribery risk, we analyze the abnormal 
returns of these equities with the Fama-French five-factor model. We hypothesize that equities 
with higher bribery risk also deliver higher abnormal returns.  
Hypothesis III: Within the GPFG’s portfolio, equities with high FBRI scores have higher 
abnormal returns than equities with low FBRI scores. 
Table 10 presents the regression result assuming GPFG weighted portfolios in columns (1) to 
(3) and equal-weighted portfolios in columns (4) to (6). The dependent variable for the 
regressions of the long-short portfolios in columns (1) and (4) is the delta return of portfolios 
L and H (𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝐻). In the regressions of portfolio H in column (2) and (5) the monthly excess 
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return of H (𝑟𝐻 − 𝑟𝑓) is applied as the independent variable, while the monthly excess returns 
of L (𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝑓) is applied as the independent variable of portfolio L in column (3) and (6). 
Table 10: Fama-French five-factor plus Momentum regression 
The GPFG weighted abnormal monthly return of the long L-short H portfolio is approximately 
zero as shown by the alpha value in column (1). This indicates that the portfolios L and H 
delivered almost the same level of abnormal monthly returns from 2010 until 2019 within the 
GPFG portfolio. Columns (2) and (3) present the results of the regressions of both value-
weighted portfolios separately. The significantly positive alpha values reveal that both 
portfolios have positive abnormal returns, which are significant at the 10% level (H) and to the 
5% level (L). Both stand-alone portfolios contributed to the financial performance of the GPFG 
in the examined period with a positive abnormal return of around 0.74% per month. While 
column (2) does not reveal any significant concentrations of portfolio H on the Fama French 
factors, portfolio L has a focus on aggressive portfolios indicated by the significant negative 
CMA coefficient at the 10% significance level. This implies that equities in portfolio L tend to 
pursue a more aggressive investment strategy, measured by relative changes in total assets, 
than those of portfolio H. 
Examining the regression results using the unweighted portfolio’s returns as independent 
variables provide general insights about the financial performance of the high and low bribery 
risk equities since these returns are not affected by investment decisions of the GPFG. 
Nonetheless, the results in columns (3) to (6) are similar to the weighted results. 
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When assuming equal weights for the long-short portfolio in column (4), the abnormal monthly 
returns of portfolio L are on average 0.45% higher than those of portfolio H. However, it cannot 
be inferred that this difference does not appear by chance, as the alpha is not significantly larger 
than zero. The alpha of portfolio H (column 5) declines to 0.66% compared to the weighted 
model, though gained in significance as the respective standard errors lessen disproportionally. 
Additionally, the significant positive coefficient in the SMB factor suggests a focus on small-
sized companies, which was avoided by the pension fund’s investment strategy. On the 
contrary, abnormal returns of the unweighted portfolio L inclined to a remarkable level of 
1.11% per month (column 6). This suggests a higher abnormal return for portfolio L than for 
portfolio H, which however is not statistically significant. While the load on aggressive returns 
prevails, a significant focus on the small portfolio is observable similarly to the equally 




7.1 Discussion of hypotheses 
7.1.1 Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis I: The country-specific bribery risk exposure in the GPFG is not systematically 
different than of its peer sovereign wealth funds. 
All four funds have relatively low weighted bribery risk scores between 20 and 23. In our 
comparison of country-level bribery risk, we found two contrary results. On the one hand, our 
study did not suggest any substantial deviations in average country-level bribery risk for the 
GPFG in either direction. On the other hand, the share of equities from high-risk countries 
included in the portfolio is highest for the Norwegian fund, when considering both market 
value and number of the investments. Given the outstanding size of the Norwegian fund, the 
disparity substantiates when considering the absolute market value of these securities, 
aggregating to the remarkable sum of $1.3 billion.  
The apparent puzzle of a low weighted average score that is contrasted by the large share of 
upwards outliers in the GPFG portfolio can be explained by examining the investment shares 
broken down by the different risk categories (Figure 17). Compared to ABP and APFC, the 
GPFG has a lower share of its portfolio invested in countries with moderate risk but a higher 
aggregated proportion in the low and very low categories. Since these categories account for 
the highest value of investments in the fund, the higher share of upwards outliers is not reflected 
when applying the weighted average bribery risk score. 
Figure 17: Portfolio split17 by country-level bribery risk categories of the investees 
 
17 The proportional values of the APFC do not add up to 100%. The reason for this is the fact that some of its 
equities are listed in countries like the British Virgin Islands, Curaçao, and Macao. Since the TRACE Matrix does 
not measure the bribery risk of these countries, we were not able to assign risk categories to them. 
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The underlying core consideration, crucial to answering the hypothesis, is whether weighted 
averages or the presence of upward outliers are more meaningful for bribery risk. One may 
postulate that observing several very low-risk investments will counterbalance few high-risk 
investments. Although generally true, in settings where a single observation can have very 
serious consequences, average values indicating whether the event might occur are misleading. 
The focus on upwards outliers and identification of red flags is considered a best practice in 
determining bribery risk to combat corruption and ensure compliance (TRACE 2019a:1). This 
applies to corporate and fund managers. Consequently, since the GPFG have a systematically 
higher share of companies from high bribery countries compared to its peers, we reject the first 
hypothesis. 
The results elaborated above raise the question of which investments cause the increased share 
of high-country risk equities in the GPFG portfolio. Evaluating the listing countries of each 
fund’s high-risk investments reveals different geographic properties across the funds. Figure 
18 shows the listing countries of the equities from the high-risk category. Looking at the GPFG, 
approximately 42% of its high-risk investments are listed in Egypt, accounting for $530 
million. In addition, solely the Norwegian fund invests in Bangladesh, which is the country 
with the highest bribery risk score (66) in the study. Both the GPFG and ABP hold substantial 
shares in Egypt, Nigeria, and Vietnam. While NZ Super and APFC hold the main share of high-
risk investments in African countries, the GPFG has invested around 95% in Asian equities. 
Given that the GPFG is invested in 119 equities from high-risk countries, it is remarkable that 
the absolute number of countries, where these equities are listed, is on the same level compared 
to the other funds.18 A potential explanation for that is that external shocks affecting 
compliance are more likely to appear in these countries and its mitigation would require 
intensified internal monitoring capacities from the fund. These findings underpin the 
conclusion that the GPFG is more exposed to companies from high bribery risk countries, 
which underpins the rejection of the second hypothesis. 
 
18 APFG holds investments in 5, GPFG and ABP in 4, and NZ Super in 2 high-risk countries. In the APFC, Figure 
18 depicts only its investments with a proportional value higher than 0.15%. 
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Figure 18: Proportion of investment value in high bribery risk countries 
7.1.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis II: Within the GPFG’s portfolio, firms from countries with high bribery risk are 
subject to high bribery risk at the firm level. 
The results of the pairwise t-tests suggest that, in our sample, firms from high-risk countries 
have a significantly higher bribery risk on average than those from moderate or lower risk 
countries. However, given the huge dispersion of FBRI values across categories, the absolute 
differences in averages are relatively small. Hence, the accuracy of country-level bribery risk 
as an estimator for the actual bribery risk of a company is not sufficient for the former to work 
as a reliable estimator of the latter. This is also underlined by the small differences in group 
means between the moderate-, low-, and very low-risk categories in the pairwise t-test 
comparison and the low coefficient of determination in the linear univariate regression. 
Consequently, we conclude that the listing-country risk underestimates the bribery risk 
potential of many companies in the low- and very low-risk category. Since seven out of the ten 
highest FBRI scores in our sample belong to firms in moderate or lower risk categories (see 
Appendix L with overall FBRI list), we find little support for Hypothesis II and consequently 
reject it.  
This has profound implications on the findings in the analysis under Hypothesis I. In light of 
our findings for testing the second hypothesis, we conclude that when considering a large 
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number of firms, high-level bribery risk implies a slightly higher average firm-specific bribery 
risk compared to firms from moderate or lower risk countries. However, for the analysis of the 
bribery risk of individual companies, the country-level risk is insufficient. Provided the 
findings of the univariate regression, we conclude that the listing country bribery score would 
overestimate the bribery risk of many high country-risk firms. Thus, we cannot generally 
conclude that the GPFG is at higher risk than its peer funds because of the upwards outliers, 
but the fact that these companies have on average a higher risk makes them an appropriate 
starting point for further analyses. We build upon that idea in section 7.2.1 when we discuss 
the implications of our findings for the fund. 
The reason for the lack of precision of country-level risk for a firm’s bribery risk is also 
highlighted by our analysis. Several of the factors, which are suggested by previous literature 
to be relevant determinants for the bribery risk of a firm, do not or only weakly correlate with 
the country bribery risk. In our sample, a weak positive correlation is indicated for the variables 
measuring the extent of public ownership, operating country risk, and bribery prevention 
initiatives. Correlations with Subsidiary Industry, Political Exposure, and Previous Allegations 
are slightly negative or very close to zero. Thus, we presume that the jump in FBRI scores 
between the high and moderate country risk firms is mainly driven by factors measured by the 
Operating Country and Bribery Prevention variables. We emphasize that these results only 
indicate (weak) correlation but do not allow any conclusion towards causation, due to potential 
multicollinearities to omitted variables. 
A central aspect affecting the interpretation of the results is the reliability of the FBRI as an 
accurate measure of the actual risk exposure of a company. Conclusions inferred based on the 
comparison of country-level bribery risk and FBRI become obsolete if the FBRI does not 
capture a firm’s actual risk of being involved in bribery. At its core, this problem touches upon 
the central limitation that corruption is concealed and its extent difficult to measure (Rose-
Ackerman & Palifka 2016:14). The presumptively extensive dark figure of bribery cases and 
the multitude of circumstances under which corruption can occur put empirical cause-effect 
research of corruption risk determinants on difficult terrain. Consequently, numerous critical 
assumptions had to be made for the construction of the FBRI that one should be aware of. 
Although the risk determinants included in the FBRI, such as political proximity and bribery 
prevention programs are based on concurrent academic literature, they cannot be measured 
directly. Hence, the applied variables can only be seen as approximations of the respective risk 
determinant. For instance, to estimate the quality of actual anti-bribery initiatives, the Bribery 
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Prevention scores are acquired by following a standardized assessment of public reporting on 
compliance programs. Scholars applying similar approaches like Lopatta et al. (2017:52) argue 
that the public and especially audited annual reports are sufficient approximations.  
We acknowledge that the presumably most noisy variable in the FBRI is the Subsidiary 
Industry score. The lack of research quantifying bribery risk across different business sectors 
made it challenging to implement industry-specific risk to the FBRI. Even though the sources 
applied to estimate the sectoral bribery risk are frequently used publications in corruption 
research, they are quite outdated. However, in our opinion, including a variable for industry-
level bribery risk that only approximates the real risk level is more accurate than leaving it out 
and neglecting risk differences across industries completely. 
Assigning weights to the risk factors is also a demanding task, given their subjectivity and high 
impact on the final FBRI scores. Nonetheless, we believe that the allocated weights are suitable 
to describe the interplay between the variables included in the study. Given the time constraints, 
further simplification had to be made. Additional factors contributing to firm-level bribery risk, 
such as the inherent risk of third parties used as intermediaries, are not considered. 
In conclusion, we argue that although the FBRI is not a flawless estimator of firm-level bribery 
risk, it captures several risk determinants of the phenomenon in a standardized format. In 
contrast to previous literature, it does not solely focus on public reporting or country-level risk 
scores but expands the analysis by several other relevant determinants. Accordingly, we argue 
that the FBRI is a sufficiently reliable estimator that allows deriving meaningful conclusions 
on a firm’s bribery risk exposure. In these regards, our methodology contributes to current 
research by providing an expanded approach in the challenging research field of how the 
bribery risk of a firm can be modeled and determined. 
7.1.3 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis III: Within the GPFG’s portfolio, equities with high FBRI scores have higher 
abnormal returns than equities with low FBRI scores. 
By replicating the investments of the GPFG in firms with high and low bribery risk exposure, 
we create an ex-post analysis of their delivered financial returns. The results of the Fama-
French model suggest that both portfolios H and L delivered a significantly positive abnormal 
return of around 0.74% per month to the Norwegian GPFG over the last ten years. The 
abnormal returns in the long L short H portfolio are very close to zero and nonsignificant. The 
results can be interpreted such that if the fund would have, at the beginning of 2010, sold its 
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shares of the 20 firms with the highest bribery risk in the sample and invested the amount into 
portfolio L, the abnormal return of the pension fund would have remained almost unchanged.19 
As a consequence, we reject Hypothesis III, as it is not supported by our findings. 
The positive abnormal returns suggest that the fund indeed benefitted in the past from being 
invested in the 20 companies with the highest FBRI scores. Simply buying equivalent relative 
shares of each equity disembogue in the same result. Nevertheless, for the unweighted 
portfolios, we found that the 20 equities with the lowest FBRI scores provided even higher 
abnormal returns per month. This raises the question of whether the investments in equities of 
portfolio H should be replaced by those of portfolio L because the latter brings lower 
compliance risk to the fund’s portfolio while having delivered very similar abnormal returns in 
our analysis. 
However, one should beware of drawing hasty divestment conclusions based on the presented 
results, given three reasons. Firstly, the presented regression results abstract the potential 
diversification contribution of the analyzed firms. Albeit abnormal returns of high bribery risk 
companies do not exceed those of the observed low bribery risk firms, they still might 
substantially contribute to the GPFG’s diversification, thus reducing the volatility of the total 
fund’s returns. Secondly, as outlined in section 7.1.2, the FBRI serves as an indicator to identify 
bribery red flags. One cannot infer that all firms in portfolio H are corrupt and all firms in 
portfolio L are not. Some firms of portfolio L could be corrupt as well. A divestment decision 
would call for a more thorough analysis using internal data to identify whether the presented 
red flags by the FBRI are mitigated or not. Finally, the Fama-French model requires well-
diversified portfolios to provide meaningful results. Although portfolio H (L) included equities 
from ten (13) different countries, including Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East, 
as well as eight (seven) different industries, it is unclear whether the diversification requirement 
is fully satisfied. Statman (2004:47) showed that the standard deviation of a portfolio where 
the correlation between stocks is 0.08 declines only moderately when including more than 20 
firms in the portfolio. The even lower average correlation of stock returns in portfolio H (L) of 
0.063 (0.057) supports that the diversification criteria might be met. Nonetheless, since 
 
19 Under the condition that the positions of L were increased and decreased accordingly to the positions in the 
GPFG, while the fictitious short positions of H were increased and decreased accordingly to the actual positions 
in the GPFG (i.e., when the Fund would buy additional stocks of a firm in H, the short position of that firm would 
increase by the same amount). 
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correlations of stocks historically increased over time (Bekaert et al. 2009:2593), a repetition 
of the analysis with a larger sample size would further validate the results. 
Insights gained from the analysis are that the GPFG has financially benefitted from being 
invested in the high bribery risk companies included in portfolio H over the last ten years. This 
is indicated by the statistically significant abnormal returns. The results do neither entail that 
the abnormal returns of these companies were achieved through bribery, nor do they indicate 
that any of the firms engaged in corruption after all. It also does not provide insights about 
abnormal returns of other equities in the fund that have a high bribery risk exposure. 
7.2 Implications for the Norwegian GPFG 
7.2.1 Corruption screening process 
The results of analyzing 80 firms within the GPFG showed that companies in the portfolio vary 
strongly with respect to existing red flags indicating potential bribery involvement. Given the 
large number of firms for which the FBRI score indicated red flags for investees, we suggest 
Norges Bank to implement a proactive screening process. In our opinion, a passive monitoring 
process that puts the company on an observation list, based on media reports or the 
recommendations proposed by the Council on Ethics is not sufficient, given the high number 
of investments from high-risk listing countries, compared to its peers. 
In our empirical study, we found that, on average, firms listed in countries with high bribery 
risk, are subject to elevated firm-specific risks. However, our analysis shows that firms with 
low country-level bribery risk can also encounter elevated bribery risk. These insights imply 
that solely focusing on high bribery risk countries is misleading, however, they have on average 
a slightly higher bribery risk. Thus, we recommend using country risk only as a first step of the 
screening procedure, guiding the selection of firms for further assessment. A potential 
proactive screening approach could look like this: every year a concise sample of investees is 
selected and analyzed in detail by using an approach similar to the FBRI. The share of firms 
from the high listing country risk category should exceed its share of the total portfolio (1.6% 
by the end of 2019). We suggest including 5-10% of firms with high listing country risk. The 
remaining 95-90% of firms can be selected randomly from all other country risk categories. 
As the FBRI only requires data that is publicly available or can be gathered through data 
providers, it can be calculated for and compared among several firms. Thus, the FBRI could 
be determined for a sample of several firms from the fund’s portfolio. Following a staggered 
approach, those companies with particularly high FBRI scores, or scores of a similar indicator, 
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could be then examined in more detail, utilizing additional internal information that can be 
requested through the dialogue with investees. Hence, one would ensure that employee 
capacity is efficiently used by focusing on companies, of which the FBRI raised concern in a 
less time-consuming upfront screening.  
Moreover, we suggest extending the expectation document (Norges Bank 2020b). The 
investees should be encouraged to disclose information about their ownership structure and the 
political exposure of their executive boards. This would increase bargaining power in cases 
where such information is requested from the client, as the provision of relevant anti-corruption 
data becomes an official prerequisite for being invested in such firms. 
7.2.2 Communication with Council on Ethics 
As described in section 2.2.2, NBIM’s escalation process of corruption cases is often lengthy 
and lacks efficiency. Moreover, the communication and information exchange between Norges 
Bank and the Council on Ethics appears one-sided. The final decision of the bank is often made 
without a thorough clarification. This makes the bank’s risk monitoring process appear vague 
and secretive. Consolidating the FBRI red flags to the screening process would help to 
standardize the current risk analysis procedure. It would increase the transparency of the risk 
detection and ease the information flow between the Bank and Council. A more detailed 
rationale, based on quantitative analysis, could be provided to both the Council and the public 
regarding the motives why a company was excluded by the fund or put on the observation list. 
7.3 Limitations of the methodology 
Our thesis focuses on a specific type of corrupt behavior: the engagement in public bribery. 
Since corruption arises in various forms with contrasting patterns, the scope of this thesis is 
narrowed down to research this complex phenomenon accurately. The risk that companies 
engage in other forms of corrupt activities like money laundering, nepotism or embezzlement 
is not addressed by the presented study. This affects our analysis in different aspects. For 
instance, given their business environment, the risk of financial institutions such as banks and 
insurance companies being involved in money laundering may be higher compared to bribery. 
Although the FBRI can be assumed to correlate with the risk of a firm being involved in other 
types of corruption to a certain degree, it is crucial to bear in mind that it is developed to indicate 
bribery risk with respect to public officials. Further, bribery taking place between firms is not 
directly examined. Therefore, the conclusions of our findings cannot be inferred for business-
to-business bribery.  
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Another limiting factor for the interpretation of our results is the concealed nature and 
inconsistent legal definition of corruption. An act is only corruption when the law defines it as 
such. However, as mentioned under section 3.1, the preconditions for an act to be illegal and 
thereby corruption vary across jurisdictions. Both, country-level corruption risk measures like 
the TRACE Matrix and the FBRI assume that a common concept of bribery exists and can be 
measured, which does not hold in reality. Such indicators aim to measure whether a critical 
threshold of favor is exceeded, making a favor corrupt. However, the actual threshold of bribery 
deviates across jurisdictions. These factors hamper all empirical research on corruption and 
call for cautious interpretation of the results. 
Concerning our first hypothesis, we found that publicly available information regarding the 
equity investment portfolio of sovereign wealth funds is vastly limited. Therefore, a selection 
bias could be apparent for the chosen peer funds. SWFs that disclose data on their portfolio 
structure demonstrate high transparency, which might signal generally profound compliance 
mechanisms regarding their investment decisions. Thus, relative to the whole population of 
SWFs, the GPFG might appear less exposed to bribery risk than it appears in the comparison 
with the selected peer group.  
Further uncertainty affects the calculated country-level bribery risk by using the TRACE 
Matrix scores. The accuracy of cross-country indices is widely disputed in academic literature 
as they utilize perception-based data from surveys to a large extent (Chabova 2017:1880; 
Escresa & Picci 2017:196-97). On one hand, possible idiosyncratic variations of TRACE 
scores are mitigated through the conducted robustness check. On the other hand, since the TI-
CPI and the WB-CoC indices are aggregated using perception-based data as well, systematic 
deviations through subjective biases of bribery perception cannot be eliminated. Additionally, 
relying on the risk categories (very low, low, moderate, high, very high) defined by TRACE 
might be misleading, as setting threshold values between countries with seemingly similar risk 
characteristics is largely discretionary. For example, the Slovak Republic belongs to the low-
risk category with a risk score of 38, while Croatia falls into the moderate bribery risk category 
given its country score of 41. This issue was also addressed in the critical assessment of 
corruption indices published by Søreide (2006:8-9), who points out that a decreasing precision 
level of the TI-CPI would better account for the uncertainty of estimates. 
The second hypothesis is tested by calculating the FBRI scores on a sample of 80 companies. 
The small sample size reduces the statistical power of our study. Since there are only 20 
companies included in each risk category, the standard error of the scores is relatively high. On 
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the other hand, a strength of the sample size chosen is that it can be reproduced in a relatively 
short time. An additional limitation we face with the FBRI is that we cannot test its accuracy, 
given the lack of an available and precise response variable. At this point, we want to stress the 
meaning of the FBRI once more. It is an indicator to identify bribery red flags. It does not imply 
that all firms with a high score are guilty of corruption and that all firms with a low score are 
clean. It can be seen as a starting point for a more thorough analysis for those companies at 
high risk to clarify whether the discovered red flags are accurately addressed and mitigated.  
The results of the analysis using the Fama-French model may be limited by the accuracy of the 
model. The model fails to explain a large share of the variations within historical stock returns, 
as shown, for instance, by Sattar (2017:123). Especially on a global level, the Fama-French 
model is imprecise in explaining stock return variations (Fama & French 2012:471). 
Nonetheless, we decided to apply the Fama-French model since it is commonly used by 
scholars and practitioners alike and has empirically stronger evidence than all other common 
asset pricing models like the CAPM (Sattar 2017). As a last remark, the small sample size of 
20 companies for Portfolios H and L restricts the generalization of our findings to the whole 
portfolio of the GPFG. The results can only be interpreted for the two artificially created 





8.1 Summary of findings 
In this thesis, we examine the extent of bribery risk in the GPFG’s portfolio and analyze 
whether the fund benefitted historically from being invested in companies with high bribery 
risk. Three separate analyses are conducted to pursue the research question. Firstly, we 
investigate the bribery risk exposure of the GPFG by comparing the TRACE scores of its 
investments’ listing countries to those of a peer group of SWFs. Secondly, we evaluate whether 
the country-level risk is a suitable estimator for the actual bribery risk of a firm. Lastly, the 
historic financial returns of a sample of equities with high bribery risk in the GPFG are analyzed 
to assess whether the fund benefitted from being invested in these companies. 
At first, the country-level exposure of the portfolio is analyzed by conducting a comparative 
analysis of the GPFG with three peer SWFs from New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Alaska. 
The country-level risk of all examined funds is modest. Applying a value-weighted average of 
all investment’s country-level bribery risk revealed that all funds have scores ranging between 
19.5 (NZ Super) and 23.7 (ABP). The GPFG and the Alaskan APFC have scores of 
approximately 21. Relying on the bribery risk categories defined by the TRACE Matrix, none 
of the funds had investments in countries from the very high-risk category. Further, we identify 
only a few holdings with high country risk within the surveyed portfolios. The GPFG has both 
the largest relative number of equities, and the highest share of its AUM invested in firms from 
high-risk countries. 
Besides solely focusing on listing country risk, the FBRI is developed to identify further 
determinants indicative of bribery involvement of a firm. Within our sample, firms from high 
bribery risk countries following the TRACE Matrix are on average subject to significantly 
higher firm-specific risks than companies with lower country risks. However, differences 
between the moderate, low, and very low country risk categories are insignificant. Moreover, 
the regression of the country-level scores on FBRI scores reveals a very low R² value and high 
standard errors. Therefore, we conclude that the country-level risk is not an appropriate 
estimator of the actual bribery risk of a company. 
The relation between the listing country risk and the determinants included in the FBRI is 
further analyzed. Certain risk factors have a stronger correlation to country-level risk than 
others. However, we find generally weak correlations between the variables and the listing 
country score, ranging from -0.19 (Subsidiary Industry risk) to 0.33 (Bribery Prevention). 
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However, we find that on average firms listed in countries with high bribery risk scores are 
more often state-owned, have slightly less effective anti-corruption systems in place, and have 
subsidiaries in more risky countries. Our findings do not suggest systematic differences in 
operating industries, political proximity, and the existence of previous bribery allegations of 
firms in respect to their country’s bribery risk. 
Hence, although the GPFG has a substantially higher share of investments from high bribery 
risk countries, we cannot infer that it is more exposed to bribery risk than its peers, given that 
the listing country risk is an insufficient estimator for the actual risk of the firm, measured with 
the FBRI. Our results suggest that a detailed comparison of bribery risk between SWFs would 
require a more profound analysis than simply relying on the country-level bribery risk of the 
equities. However, Norges Bank should be aware of the slightly but statistically significant 
higher bribery risk of the firms from high bribery risk countries and should address these issues 
through compliance screenings of their investees. 
Regarding the third part of our analysis, the financial performance of the 20 companies with 
the highest and lowest FBRI scores is analyzed with the Fama-French five-factor model 
extended by the Momentum factor. The regression reveals that the GPFG financially benefitted 
from being invested in those firms from 2010 to 2019. However, we cannot establish significant 
differences between the high bribery risk and low bribery risk portfolio’s abnormal returns. 
Our findings contribute to current research by providing an approach to compare bribery risk 
exposure of several SWFs, which, to our knowledge, has not been conducted before. Further 
implications of our analysis suggest that country-level bribery should not be used as a proxy 
for the corruption risk of a particular firm. This applies to scholars conducting empirical 
research on corruption and for practitioners aiming to approximate the bribery risk of a 
particular firm. A respective analysis requires the consideration of further information in 
respect to the firm itself and its operating industries and countries. With the creation of the 
FBRI, we propose a standardized approach for estimating the potential risk of bribery 
involvement at the firm level. 
8.2 Outline for prospective research 
How can something unobservable be accurately measured? This question hits the most rigid 
constraint on empirical research of corruption. Although challenging, the opaque structure of 
corruption provides a vast arena of interesting research topics that ought to be examined in the 
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future. In the course of preparing this thesis, we faced several limitations of current research 
that root in the problem mentioned above, showcasing the relevance of further research. 
This paper compares the GPFG with three other pension funds. Another interesting comparison 
could examine differences and similarities in bribery risk between pension funds and large-
sized hedge funds. Similar to this thesis, the comparison of country-level bribery risk of the 
portfolios might be used as a starting point. However, since we showed that the country-level 
bribery risk is not a sufficient estimator of the firm-specific bribery risk, an indicator like the 
FBRI could be applied to examine the largest investments in each portfolio. Similar analyses 
could be conducted across the skyrocketing number of ESG labeled hedge funds. An analysis 
comparing corruption risk exposure in governance-oriented hedge funds with social- and 
environment-prioritized ones could provide interesting insights about the implications of 
responsible investment strategies with distinct ESG prioritizations on corruption risk. 
Besides focusing exclusively on equities, another interesting exercise would be to consider 
fixed income investments. Such an analysis would be even more challenging than only 
comparing equities since the issuers of bonds and bills are not only firms but also governments, 
municipalities, or explicit projects like the construction of wind farms or solar plants. An 
analytical approach might elaborate on differences in the consequences of money flowing into 
corrupt firms or governments. While corrupt companies might use funds to secure a contract 
through bribery, corrupt governments might finance unnecessary construction projects, 
approved for personal gain at the expense of society. A descriptive approach could shed light 
on such mechanisms while an empirical study might compare funds’ corruption risk in respect 
to the government bonds included in the portfolios. 
In our analysis of industry-level bribery risk, we were confronted with a lack of current data, 
that would enable insights into corruption risk differences between industries. Reports that 
address this topic, for instance from TI and the OECD, are already several years old. Although 
the WB Enterprise Survey provides a large data set of experience-based data about bribery of 
different firms, we could not apply it to analyze differences in experiences across industries as 
the provided industry code is not sufficiently granular to distinguish, for instance, between 
defense and other heavy equipment manufacturers. Reporting a four-digit SIC or six-digit 
NAICS code of the responding firms would increase the value of this dataset for research on 
corruption risk at the industry level. Another interesting research field related to industry-level 
bribery risk, which is currently insufficiently covered, is the relation of industry and country-
level risk. The industry risk and country-level risk in the FBRI are assumed to contribute to a 
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firm’s bribery risk exposure independent of each other. However, firms operating in high-risk 
industries and high-risk countries might face disproportionally higher corruption risk than 
firms in high-risk industries in low-risk countries. 
Creating a measure that estimates the bribery risk of companies by considering several red flags 
is an integral part of the thesis at hand. The literature review showed that previous approaches 
estimating the bribery risk at the firm level applied either the country-level risk factor, which 
we found insufficient or the reporting about anti-corruption programs and compliance efforts. 
As depicted by the FBRI, it is possible to create indicators that reflect several aspects of bribery 
risk. However, current research about how such an indicator could be developed is limited 
despite the clear value that such a measure has for both academics and practitioners. 
Practitioners could utilize a respective indicator by applying it as a preliminary identification 
tool for bribery red flags. Empirical studies may benefit from an estimator of firm-level bribery 
risk, for analyzing the relations between corruption risk and other firm characteristics like 
management quality, financial performance, or even carbon emissions. The increasing 
availability of large ESG data provides vast opportunities for the academic field of corruption 
and research will have to play a crucial role in promoting its utilization to shed more light on 
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Appendix A: Risk category thresholds defined by the TRACE Matrix 
 
Risk level Overall bribery risk score Example countries (scores) 
Very low 1 < risk score < 22 Denmark (1), United States (20) 
Low 23 < risk score < 38 France (24), Slovak Republic (38) 
Moderate 39 < risk score < 56 Croatia (41), Russian Federation (54) 
High 57 < risk score < 74 Vietnam (58), Dem. Rep. of Congo (72) 
Very high 75 < risk score < 100 Somalia (80), North Korea (93) 
 
 




Industry Bribery Risk 
Score 
Construction 1 100.00 
Defense 2 90.91 
Transportation 3 81.82 
Utilities 4 72.73 
Extraction 5 63.64 
Human health 6 54.55 
Telecommunication 7 45.45 
Financial services 8 36.36 
Service Industries 9 27.27 
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 10 18.18 
Wholesale and retail 11 9.09 




Appendix C: Bribery Prevention score checklist with scores 
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Country risk Country Name Country Name
Very low United States Rapid7 Inc United States ResMed Inc
Very low Japan Ateam Inc Japan Ono Pharmaceutical Co Ltd
Very low United States Kellogg Co Japan Shin Nippon Air Technologies Co Ltd
Very low Hong Kong Tingyi Cayman Islands Holding Corp Australia PolyNovo Ltd
Very low Germany Leoni AG United States Syneos Health Inc
Very low United States Sonoco Products Co Japan Sanyo Electric Railway Co Ltd
Very low Japan Jamco Corp Japan Maruwa Unyu Kikan Co Ltd
Very low Canada Gildan Activewear Inc Taiwan Forest Water Environment Engineering Co Ltd
Very low Japan GCA Corp United States Replimune Group Inc
Very low United States East West Bancorp Inc Australia Iluka Resources Ltd
Low Chile Embotelladora Andina SA Poland Polenergia SA
Low Italy COIMA RES SpA Chile Enel Americas SA
Low Italy Banco BPM SpA France Vinci SA
Low France LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE Spain Naturgy Energy Group SA
Low France Wallix Group Poland Ryvu Therapeutics SA
Low France Exel Industries France Genfit
Low Israel Ram-On Investments & Holdings 1999 Ltd Italy Recordati SpA
Low Italy OVS SpA France Ipsen SA
Low Italy Antares Vision SpA Italy Iren SpA
Low Poland Alior Bank SA Poland Netia SA
Moderate India Bajaj Holdings & Investment Ltd Philippines Cosco Capital Inc
Moderate Brazil Azul SA India GTPL Hathway Ltd
Moderate India Kajaria Ceramics Ltd China Bestsun Energy Co Ltd
Moderate China Fu Shou Yuan International Group Ltd Qatar Qatar Electricity & Water Co QSC
Moderate China Shoucheng Holdings Ltd Brazil Telefonica Brasil SA
Moderate South Africa AVI Ltd China Huadong Medicine Co Ltd
Moderate India Borosil Glass Works Ltd Brazil Omega Geracao SA
Moderate China Sunac China Holdings Ltd South Africa AngloGold Ashanti Ltd
Moderate China Suning Universal Co Ltd Thailand Thai Airways International PCL
Moderate Brazil Via Varejo SA Indonesia Elnusa Tbk PT
High Nigeria Access Bank PLC Vietnam Vietnam National Petroleum Group
High Egypt Oriental Weavers Vietnam Petrovietnam Transportation Corp
High Vietnam Khang Dien House Trading and Investment JSC Bangladesh Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd
High Nigeria Guinness Nigeria PLC Vietnam Hoa Phat Group JSC
High Nigeria Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC Egypt Orascom Construction PLC
High Vietnam JSC Bank For Foreign Trade Of Vietnam Bangladesh Summit Power Ltd
High Bangladesh BBS Cables Ltd Nigeria MTN Nigeria Communications PLC
High Egypt Electro Cable Egypt Egypt Minapharm Pharmaceuticals
High Egypt Egyptian Financial & Industrial Co Egypt Integrated Diagnostics Holdings PLC
High Bangladesh Berger Paints Bangladesh Ltd Egypt Telecom Egypt Co
Moderate Industry Risk Increased Industry Risk
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Appendix E: Testing the assumptions of parametric data  
 





Interpretation: The p-value of the Shapiro-Wilk normality tests are higher than 0.05 for all risk categories. 




2) Homogeneity of variances 
 
 
Interpretation: Since the p-value of the conducted Levene Test (0.52) is higher than 0.05, the null hypothesis 
of equal population variances cannot be rejected. The variables do not violate the homogeneity of variance 
assumption needed for the ANOVA.  
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Appendix F: Top 3 riskiest operating countries 
  
  
ID Company Name Operating country 1 Risk score 1 Operating country 2 Risk score 2 Operating country 3 Risk score 3 Operating country score
1 Access Bank PLC Burundi 74 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 72 Guinea 61 69
2 Alior Bank SA Poland 34 NA NA NA NA 34
3 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) 72 Zimbabwe 62 Guinea 61 65
4 Antares Vision SpA Russian Federation 54 Brazil 47 India 45 48,67
5 Ateam Inc Vietnam 58 Japan 19 NA NA 38,5
6 AVI Ltd Nigeria 61 Zambia 59 South Africa 41 53,67
7 Azul SA Brazil 47 Uruguay 27 United States 20 31,33
8 Bajaj Holdings & Investment Ltd India 45 Indonesia 44 NA NA 44,5
9 Banco BPM SpA Italy 31 Switzerland 14 United Kingdom 14 19,67
10 BBS Cables Bangladesh NA NA NA NA NA 66
11 Berger Paints Bangladesh Ltd Bangladesh 66 NA NA NA NA 66
12 Bestsun Energy Co Ltd China 54 NA NA NA NA 54
13 Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd Bangladesh 66 Malaysia 38 NA NA 52
14 Borosil Glass Works Ltd India 45 United Arab Emirates 33 NA NA 39
15 COIMA RES SpA Italy 31 Luxembourg 19 NA NA 25
16 Cosco Capital Inc Philippines 51 NA NA NA NA 51
17 East West Bancorp Inc China 54 United States 20 NA NA 37
18 Egyptian Financial & Industrial Co Egypt 64 NA NA NA NA 64
19 Electro Cable Egypt Egypt 64 United Arab Emirates 33 NA NA 48,5
20 Elnusa Tbk PT Indonesia 44 NA NA NA NA 44
21 Embotelladora Andina SA Paraguay 52 Brazil 47 Argentina 44 47,67
22 Enel Americas SA Brazil 47 Colombia 45 Peru 45 45,67
23 Exel Industries Russian Federation 54 Romania 44 France 24 40,67
24 Forest Water Environment Engineering Co Ltd Samoa 50 Hong Kong 19 Taiwan 19 29,33
25 Fu Shou Yuan International Group Ltd China 54 Hong Kong 19 NA NA 36,5
26 GCA Corp Vietnam 58 China 54 India 45 52,33
27 Genfit France 24 United States 20 NA NA 22
28 Gildan Activewear Inc Honduras 59 Barbados 37 United States 20 38,67
29 GTPL Hathway Ltd India 45 NA NA NA NA 45
30 Guinness Nigeria PLC Nigeria 61 NA NA NA NA 61
31 Hoa Phat Group JSC Vietnam 58 NA NA NA NA 58
32 Huadong Medicine Co Ltd China 54 United States 20 Hong Kong 19 31
33 Iluka Resources Ltd Sierra Leone 60 China 54 Tanzania 54 56
34 INTEGRATED DIAGNOSTICS HOLDINGS PLC Sudan 66 Egypt 64 Jordan 45 58,33
35 Ipsen SA North Korea 93 Algeria 65 China 54 70,67
36 Iren SpA Honduras 59 Italy 31 NA NA 45
37 Jamco Corp Philippines 51 United States 20 Japan 19 30
38 JSC Bank For Foreign Trade Of Vietnam Laos 73 Vietnam 58 United States 20 50,33
39 Kajaria Ceramics Ltd Kazakhstan 53 India 45 United Kingdom 14 37,33
40 Kellogg Co North Korea 93 Venezuela 82 Egypt 64 79,67
41 Khang Dien House Trading and Investment JSC Vietnam 58 NA NA NA NA 58
42 Leoni AG Egypt 64 China 54 Russian Federation 54 57,33
43 LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE North Korea 93 Cambodia 80 Laos 73 82
44 Maruwa Unyu Kikan Co Ltd Japan 19 NA NA NA NA 19
45 Minapharm Pharmaceuticals Egypt 64 Germany 14 NA NA 39
46 MTN Nigeria Communications PLC Nigeria 61 NA NA NA NA 61
47 Naturgy Energy Group SA Venezuela 82 Nicaragua 67 Egypt 64 71
48 Netia SA Poland 34 NA NA NA NA 34
49 Omega Geracao SA Brazil 47 NA NA NA NA 47
50 Ono Pharmaceutical Co Ltd North Korea 93 South Korea 20 United States 20 44,33
51 Orascom Construction PLC Algeria 65 Egypt 64 Nigeria 61 63,33
52 Oriental Weavers Egypt 64 China 54 United States 20 46
53 OVS SpA China 54 Serbia 50 India 45 49,67
54 Petrovietnam Transportation Corp Vietnam 58 Malaysia 38 France 24 40
55 Polenergia SA Poland 34 NA NA NA NA 34
56 PolyNovo Ltd United States 20 Australia 15 New Zealand 8 14,33
57 Qatar Electricity & Water Co QSC Qatar 50 Oman 48 NA NA 49
58 Ram-On Investments & Holdings 1999 Ltd China 54 Israel 31 United States 20 35
59 Rapid7 Inc Israel 31 United States 20 Japan 19 23,33
60 Recordati SpA Russian Federation 54 Turkey 52 Mexico 49 51,67
61 Replimune Group Inc United States 20 United Kingdom 14 NA NA 17
62 ResMed Inc North Korea 93 China 54 Mexico 49 65,33
63 Ryvu Therapeutics SA Poland 34 United Kingdom 14 NA NA 24
64 Sanyo Electric Railway Co Ltd Japan 19 NA NA NA NA 19
65 Shin Nippon Air Technologies Co Ltd China 54 Sri Lanka 47 Japan 19 40
66 Shoucheng Holdings Ltd China 54 Samoa 50 Hong Kong 19 41
67 Sonoco Products Co Venezuela 82 China 54 Russian Federation 54 63,33
68 Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC Nigeria 61 NA NA NA NA 61
69 Summit Power Ltd Bangladesh 66 NA NA NA NA 66
70 Sunac China Holdings Ltd China 54 Hong Kong 19 NA NA 36,5
71 Suning Universal Co Ltd China 54 NA NA NA NA 54
72 Syneos Health Inc Lebanon 59 France 24 United States 20 34,33
73 Telecom Egypt Co Algeria 65 Egypt 64 Morocco 48 59
74 Telefonica Brasil SA Brazil 47 Netherlands 11 NA NA 29
75 Thai Airways International PCL Thailand 47 United States 20 Germany 14 27
76 Tingyi Cayman Islands Holding Corp China 54 Hong Kong 19 NA NA 36,5
77 Via Varejo SA Brazil 47 NA NA NA NA 47
78 Vietnam National Petroleum Group Laos 73 Vietnam 58 Singapore 17 49,33
79 Vinci SA Cambodia 80 Chad 75 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 72 75,67
80 Wallix Group France 24 Spain 24 United States 20 22,67
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Appendix G: Top 3 riskiest subsidiary industries 
 
Note: BBS Cables has no subsidiaries, so it is not included in the above list. 
  
Name SIC_code1 SIC1_description Risk_score1 SIC_code2 SIC2_description Risk_score2 SIC_code3 SIC3_description Risk_score3 subsidiary_score
1 Access Bank PLC 602 Financial services 37 737 Service Industries 28 NA NA NA 32,5
2 Alior Bank SA 614 Financial services 37 737 Service Industries 28 594 Wholesale and retail 10 25
3 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 353 Construction 100 104 Extraction 64 806 Human health 55 73
4 Antares Vision SpA 356 Defense 91 737 Service Industries 28 369 Manufacturing 0 39,67
5 Ateam Inc 671 Financial services 37 899 Service Industries 28 355 Manufacturing 0 21,67
6 AVI Ltd 122 Extraction 64 283 Human health 55 672 Financial services 37 52
7 Azul SA 451 Transportation 82 672 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 49
8 Bajaj Holdings & Investment Ltd 491 Utilities 73 615 Financial services 37 829 Service Industries 28 46
9 Banco BPM SpA 152 Construction 100 422 Transportation 82 138 Extraction 64 82
10 Berger Paints Bangladesh Ltd 325 Manufacturing 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0
11 Bestsun Energy Co Ltd 179 Construction 100 421 Transportation 82 492 Utilities 73 85
12 Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd 283 Human health 55 621 Financial services 37 NA NA NA 46
13 Borosil Glass Works Ltd 508 Wholesale and retail 10 322 Manufacturing 0 NA NA NA 5
14 COIMA RES SpA 153 Construction 100 653 Financial services 37 NA NA NA 68,5
15 Cosco Capital Inc 131 Extraction 64 679 Financial services 37 874 Service Industries 28 43
16 East West Bancorp Inc 602 Financial services 37 NA NA NA NA NA NA 37
17 Egyptian Financial & Industrial Co 289 Manufacturing 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0
18 Electro Cable Egypt 401 Transportation 82 508 Wholesale and retail 10 NA NA NA 46
19 Elnusa Tbk PT 177 Construction 100 131 Extraction 64 672 Financial services 37 67
20 Embotelladora Andina SA 401 Transportation 82 672 Financial services 37 701 Service Industries 28 49
21 Enel Americas SA 162 Construction 100 449 Transportation 82 491 Utilities 73 85
22 Exel Industries 174 Construction 100 356 Defense 91 653 Financial services 37 76
23 Forest Water Environment Engineering Co Ltd 495 Utilities 73 671 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 46
24 Fu Shou Yuan International Group Ltd 671 Financial services 37 726 Service Industries 28 519 Wholesale and retail 10 25
25 GCA Corp 628 Financial services 37 874 Service Industries 28 NA NA NA 32,5
26 Genfit 283 Human health 55 873 Service Industries 28 NA NA NA 41,5
27 Gildan Activewear Inc 621 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 226 Manufacturing 0 21,67
28 GTPL Hathway Ltd 483 Telecommunication 46 737 Service Industries 28 366 Manufacturing 0 24,67
29 Guinness Nigeria PLC 208 Manufacturing 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0
30 Hoa Phat Group JSC 179 Construction 100 108 Extraction 64 651 Financial services 37 67
31 Huadong Medicine Co Ltd 421 Transportation 82 809 Human health 55 615 Financial services 37 58
32 Iluka Resources Ltd 152 Construction 100 472 Transportation 82 109 Extraction 64 82
33 INTEGRATED DIAGNOSTICS HOLDINGS PLC 384 Human health 55 NA NA NA NA NA NA 55
34 Ipsen SA 283 Human health 55 631 Financial services 37 873 Service Industries 28 40
35 Iren SpA 171 Construction 100 495 Utilities 73 671 Financial services 37 70
36 Jamco Corp 348 Defense 91 421 Transportation 82 762 Service Industries 28 67
37 JSC Bank For Foreign Trade Of Vietnam 602 Financial services 37 NA NA NA NA NA NA 37
38 Kajaria Ceramics Ltd 738 Service Industries 28 327 Manufacturing 0 NA NA NA 14
39 Kellogg Co 632 Financial services 37 737 Service Industries 28 509 Wholesale and retail 10 25
40 Khang Dien House Trading and Investment JSC 152 Construction 100 679 Financial services 37 083 Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 19 52
41 Leoni AG 173 Construction 100 362 Defense 91 671 Financial services 37 76
42 LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE 152 Construction 100 472 Transportation 82 735 Extraction 64 82
43 Maruwa Unyu Kikan Co Ltd 421 Transportation 82 641 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 49
44 Minapharm Pharmaceuticals 283 Human health 55 873 Service Industries 28 512 Wholesale and retail 10 31
45 MTN Nigeria Communications PLC 489 Telecommunication 46 616 Financial services 37 729 Service Industries 28 37
46 Naturgy Energy Group SA 179 Construction 100 441 Transportation 82 493 Utilities 73 85
47 Netia SA 162 Construction 100 489 Telecommunication 46 737 Service Industries 28 58
48 Omega Geracao SA 162 Construction 100 491 Utilities 73 671 Financial services 37 70
49 Ono Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 283 Human health 55 672 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 40
50 Orascom Construction PLC 162 Construction 100 422 Transportation 82 491 Utilities 73 85
51 Oriental Weavers 602 Financial services 37 523 Wholesale and retail 10 227 Manufacturing 0 15,67
52 OVS SpA 152 Construction 100 478 Transportation 82 653 Financial services 37 73
53 Petrovietnam Transportation Corp 461 Transportation 82 138 Extraction 64 671 Financial services 37 61
54 Polenergia SA 491 Utilities 73 653 Financial services 37 874 Service Industries 28 46
55 PolyNovo Ltd 384 Human health 55 873 Service Industries 28 591 Wholesale and retail 10 31
56 Qatar Electricity & Water Co QSC 491 Utilities 73 874 Service Industries 28 NA NA NA 50,5
57 Ram-On Investments & Holdings 1999 Ltd 762 Service Industries 28 509 Wholesale and retail 10 308 Manufacturing 0 12,67
58 Rapid7 Inc 179 Construction 100 671 Financial services 37 737 Service Industries 28 55
59 Recordati SpA 283 Human health 55 651 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 40
60 Replimune Group Inc 873 Service Industries 28 NA NA NA NA NA NA 28
61 ResMed Inc 478 Transportation 82 384 Human health 55 489 Telecommunication 46 61
62 Ryvu Therapeutics SA 873 Service Industries 28 NA NA NA NA NA NA 28
63 Sanyo Electric Railway Co Ltd 162 Construction 100 421 Transportation 82 653 Financial services 37 73
64 Shin Nippon Air Technologies Co Ltd 171 Construction 100 653 Financial services 37 762 Service Industries 28 55
65 Shoucheng Holdings Ltd 449 Transportation 82 679 Financial services 37 874 Service Industries 28 49
66 Sonoco Products Co 356 Defense 91 478 Transportation 82 671 Financial services 37 70
67 Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC 615 Financial services 37 NA NA NA NA NA NA 37
68 Summit Power Ltd 491 Utilities 73 NA NA NA NA NA NA 73
69 Sunac China Holdings Ltd 154 Construction 100 653 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 55
70 Suning Universal Co Ltd 653 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 324 Manufacturing 0 21,67
71 Syneos Health Inc 809 Human health 55 671 Financial services 37 874 Service Industries 28 40
72 Telecom Egypt Co 489 Telecommunication 46 357 Manufacturing 0 NA NA NA 23
73 Telefonica Brasil SA 478 Transportation 82 489 Telecommunication 46 615 Financial services 37 55
74 Thai Airways International PCL 451 Transportation 82 598 Extraction 64 829 Service Industries 28 58
75 Tingyi Cayman Islands Holding Corp 609 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 514 Wholesale and retail 10 25
76 Via Varejo SA 421 Transportation 82 615 Financial services 37 738 Service Industries 28 49
77 Vietnam National Petroleum Group 161 Construction 100 441 Transportation 82 517 Extraction 64 82
78 Vinci SA 152 Construction 100 458 Transportation 82 493 Utilities 73 85
79 Wallix Group 737 Service Industries 28 274 Manufacturing 0 NA NA NA 14
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Appendix H: Overview of all companies with state ownership in the sample 
Name Publicly owned share Country 
Orascom Construction PLC 84.65% Dubai 
Vietnam National Petroleum Group 82.79% Vietnam 
Telecom Egypt Co 80.00% Egypt 
JSC Bank For Foreign Trade Of Vietnam 74.80% Vietnam 
Thai Airways International PCL 57.53% Thailand 
Qatar Electricity & Water Co QSC 54.54% Qatar 
Egyptian Financial & Industrial Co 51.19% Egypt 
Elnusa Tbk PT 51.10% Indonesia 
Petrovietnam Transportation Corp 51.00% Vietnam 
COIMA RES SpA 40.13% Qatar 
Iren SpA 18.53% Commune di Torino 
Polenergia SA 15.99% China 
AVI Ltd 15.04% South Africa 
Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC 13.94% South Africa 
Shoucheng Holdings Ltd 12.60% China 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 10.41% South Africa 
Ram-On Investments & Holdings 1999 Ltd 6.00% India 
Gildan Activewear Inc 5.96% Quebec 
Oriental Weavers 5.00% Egypt 
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Appendix I: Overview of number of PEPs on board level for the 80 sample companies 
Company Name PEPs in Board of Directors PEP score 
Rapid7 Inc 3 50 
Ateam Inc 5 75 
Kellogg Co 0 0 
Tingyi Cayman Islands Holding Corp 5 75 
Leoni AG 9 100 
Sonoco Products Co 1 50 
Jamco Corp 0 0 
Gildan Activewear Inc 8 100 
GCA Corp 8 100 
East West Bancorp Inc 1 50 
Embotelladora Andina SA 3 50 
COIMA RES SpA 0 0 
Banco BPM SpA 16 100 
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE 12 100 
Wallix Group 1 50 
Exel Industries 1 50 
Ram-On Investments & Holdings 1999 Ltd 0 0 
OVS SpA 1 50 
Antares Vision SpA 0 0 
Alior Bank SA 5 75 
Bajaj Holdings & Investment Ltd 7 100 
Azul SA 4 75 
Kajaria Ceramics Ltd 3 50 
Fu Shou Yuan International Group Ltd 7 100 
Shoucheng Holdings Ltd 5 75 
AVI Ltd 3 50 
Borosil Glass Works Ltd 2 50 
Sunac China Holdings Ltd 8 100 
Suning Universal Co Ltd 4 75 
Via Varejo SA 4 75 
Access Bank PLC 3 50 
Oriental Weavers 4 75 
Khang Dien House Trading and Investment JSC 1 50 
Guinness Nigeria PLC 2 50 
Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC 1 50 
JSC Bank For Foreign Trade Of Vietnam 9 100 
BBS Cables Ltd 3 50 
Electro Cable Egypt 2 50 
Egyptian Financial & Industrial Co 1 50 
Berger Paints Bangladesh Ltd 10 100 
ResMed Inc 2 50 
Ono Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 11 100 
Shin Nippon Air Technologies Co Ltd 4 75 
PolyNovo Ltd 2 50 
Syneos Health Inc 3 50 
Sanyo Electric Railway Co Ltd 0 0 
Maruwa Unyu Kikan Co Ltd 0 0 
Forest Water Environment Engineering Co Ltd 1 50 
Replimune Group Inc 3 50 
Iluka Resources Ltd 3 50 
Polenergia SA 2 50 
Enel Americas SA 4 75 
Vinci SA 11 100 
Naturgy Energy Group SA 6 75 
Ryvu Therapeutics SA 1 50 
Genfit 2 50 
Recordati SpA 3 50 
Ipsen SA 4 75 
Iren SpA 0 0 
Netia SA 4 75 
Cosco Capital Inc 1 50 
GTPL Hathway Ltd 2 50 
Bestsun Energy Co Ltd 7 100 
Qatar Electricity & Water Co QSC 8 100 
Telefonica Brasil SA 5 75 
Huadong Medicine Co Ltd 8 100 
Omega Geracao SA 1 50 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 6 75 
Thai Airways International PCL 11 100 
Elnusa Tbk PT 5 75 
Vietnam National Petroleum Group 5 75 
Petrovietnam Transportation Corp 6 75 
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd 7 100 
Hoa Phat Group JSC 5 75 
Orascom Construction PLC 1 50 
Summit Power Ltd 7 100 
MTN Nigeria Communications PLC 3 50 
Minapharm Pharmaceuticals 0 0 
Integrated Diagnostics Holdings PLC 3 50 
Telecom Egypt Co 3 50 
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Appendix J: Considered Previous Allegation Cases  
 
  
Company Name Year Case Description Source 
ResMed Inc 2020 
Kickbacks in form of free call centre services, free 
loans and access to sleep tests for clients to 









Two employees were arrested and prosecuted for 
bribery allegation by the Tsu District Public 





Sierra Rutile Ltd., acquired in December 2016 by 
Iluka Resources is alleged to bribe Sierra Leone 
cabinet minister Diana Konomanyi to obtain mining 







Tickets and benefits worth more than four million 
dollar were provided to politicians and officials with 
strategic influence in Brazil, that might support the 







Official authorities in different countries prosecuted 
several employees of AngloGolg Ashanti for 










In 2020, the Thai National Anti-Corruption 
Commission (NACC) started investigations into 










A top Vietnamese official has been sacked for 
corruption allegations while running national oil and 
gas firm PetroVietnam, in a rare public censure by 







Yusuf Saloojee, a South African diplomat, was 
arrested for facilitating bribes on behalf of MTN 








Egypt's Administrative Control Authority announced 
they arrested several high-rank officials for bribery in 




Appendix K: Bribery prevention scores 
  





Rapid7 Inc 1 0 0 0 3 1 5 50
Ateam Inc 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 70
Kellogg Co 1 1 1 1 2 1 7 30
Tingyi Cayman Islands Holding Corp 1 1 1 1 2 3 9 10
Leoni AG 1 1 1 1 3 2 9 10
Sonoco Products Co 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
Jamco Corp 1 0 0 0 2 2 5 50
Gildan Activewear Inc 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
GCA Corp 1 0 0 0 0 3 4 60
East West Bancorp Inc 1 1 0 1 3 2 8 20
Embotelladora Andina SA 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
COIMA RES SpA 1 0 0 1 2 3 7 30
Banco BPM SpA 1 1 1 1 3 1 8 20
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE 1 1 1 1 3 2 9 10
Wallix Group 1 1 0 0 0 3 5 50
Exel Industries 1 1 0 1 2 3 8 20
Ram-On Investments & Holdings 1999 Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 80
OVS SpA 1 1 1 1 2 3 9 10
Antares Vision SpA 1 0 0 0 2 2 5 50
Alior Bank SA 1 0 0 1 2 2 6 40
Bajaj Holdings & Investment Ltd 1 0 0 0 3 2 6 40
Azul SA 1 0 0 1 2 2 6 40
Kajaria Ceramics Ltd 1 1 0 1 2 3 8 20
Fu Shou Yuan International Group Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 70
Shoucheng Holdings Ltd 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
AVI Ltd 1 1 1 1 3 2 9 10
Borosil Glass Works Ltd 1 0 0 1 2 3 7 30
Sunac China Holdings Ltd 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 40
Suning Universal Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 70
Via Varejo SA 1 1 0 1 3 1 7 30
Access Bank PLC 1 1 0 1 2 2 7 30
Oriental Weavers 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 80
Khang Dien House Trading and Investment JSC 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 90
Guinness Nigeria PLC 1 1 1 1 3 2 9 10
Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC 1 0 0 0 2 3 6 40
Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam JSC 1 0 0 0 2 3 6 40
BBS Cables Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 70
Electro Cable Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Egyptian Financial & Industrial Co 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 90
Berger Paints Bangladesh Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 60
ResMed Inc 1 1 0 1 0 1 4 60
Ono Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 1 1 1 1 3 2 9 10
Shin Nippon Air Technologies Co Ltd 1 0 0 1 1 2 5 50
PolyNovo Ltd 1 1 0 1 3 3 9 10
Syneos Health Inc 1 1 0 1 3 1 7 30
Sanyo Electric Railway Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 90
Maruwa Unyu Kikan Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 80
Forest Water Environment Engineering Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 80
Replimune Group Inc 1 1 0 1 0 3 6 40
Iluka Resources Ltd 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
Polenergia SA 1 0 1 0 1 1 4 60
Enel Americas SA 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
Vinci SA 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
Naturgy Energy Group SA 1 1 1 1 3 1 8 20
Ryvu Therapeutics SA 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 90
Genfit 1 1 1 1 2 0 6 40
Recordati SpA 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
Ipsen SA 1 1 1 1 2 1 7 30
Iren SpA 1 1 1 1 2 2 8 20
Netia SA 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 70
Cosco Capital Inc 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 50
GTPL Hathway Ltd 1 1 0 1 2 3 8 20
Bestsun Energy Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 90
Qatar Electricity & Water Co QSC 1 0 0 0 0 3 4 60
Telefonica Brasil SA 1 1 1 1 2 3 9 10
Huadong Medicine Co Ltd 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 80
Omega Geracao SA 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 90
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 1 1 1 1 3 2 9 10
Thai Airways International PCL 1 1 1 1 2 3 9 10
Elnusa Tbk PT 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
Vietnam National Petroleum Group 1 1 1 1 0 3 7 30
Petrovietnam Transportation Corp 1 0 0 0 1 3 5 50
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 60
Hoa Phat Group JSC 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 80
Orascom Construction PLC 1 1 0 1 3 1 7 30
Summit Power Ltd 1 1 1 1 3 3 10 0
MTN Nigeria Communications PLC 1 1 0 1 2 0 5 50
Minapharm Pharmaceuticals 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 90
Integrated Diagnostics Holdings PLC 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 60
Telecom Egypt Co 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 80
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PEP score Anti corruption effort score FBRI
1 Bestsun Energy Co Ltd Moderate China 54 54.00 85.00 0 0 100 90 68.15
2 LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE Low France 24 82.00 82.00 0 0 100 10 61.20
3 Hoa Phat Group JSC High Vietnam 58 58.00 67.00 0 0 75 80 60.55
4 ResMed Inc Very low United States 20 65.33 61.00 0 100 50 60 60.12
5 Orascom Construction PLC High Egypt 64 63.33 85.00 100 0 50 30 59.42
6 Vinci SA Low France 24 75.67 91.00 0 0 100 0 59.23
7 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Moderate South Africa 41 65.00 73.00 50 100 75 10 58.00
8 Naturgy Energy Group SA Low Spain 24 71.00 85.00 0 0 75 20 57.60
9 Telecom Egypt Co High Egypt 64 59.00 23.00 100 100 50 80 57.40
10 Omega Geracao SA Moderate Brazil 47 47.00 70.00 0 0 50 90 56.95
11 Qatar Electricity & Water Co QSC Moderate Qatar 50 49.00 50.50 100 0 100 60 56.78
12 Petrovietnam Transportation Corp High Vietnam 58 40.00 61.00 100 100 75 50 56.75
13 Khang Dien House Trading and Investment JSCHigh Vietnam 58 58.00 52.00 0 0 50 90 56.30
14 Vietnam National Petroleum Group High Vietnam 58 49.33 82.00 100 0 75 30 56.27
15 Electro Cable Egypt High Egypt 64 48.50 46.00 0 0 50 100 53.48
16 Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd High Bangladesh 66 52.00 46.00 0 0 100 60 51.70
17 BBS Cables Ltd High Bangladesh 66 66.00 37.00 0 0 50 70 51.35
17 Huadong Medicine Co Ltd Moderate China 54 31.00 58.00 0 0 100 80 51.35
17 Summit Power Ltd High Bangladesh 66 66.00 73.00 0 0 100 0 51.35
20 Integrated Diagnostics Holdings PLC High Egypt 64 58.33 55.00 0 0 50 60 51.17
21 Leoni AG Very low Germany 14 57.33 76.00 0 0 100 10 51.07
22 MTN Nigeria Communications PLC High Nigeria 58 61.00 37.00 0 100 50 50 50.60
23 Egyptian Financial & Industrial Co High Egypt 64 64.00 0.00 100 0 50 90 50.40
24 Iluka Resources Ltd Very low Australia 15 56.00 82.00 0 100 50 0 50.10
25 Bajaj Holdings & Investment Ltd Moderate India 45 44.50 46.00 100 0 100 40 50.08
26 JSC Bank For Foreign Trade Of Vietnam High Vietnam 58 50.33 37.00 100 0 100 40 49.87
27 GCA Corp Very low Japan 19 52.33 32.50 0 0 100 60 48.44
28 Ipsen SA Low France 24 70.67 40.00 0 0 75 30 48.23
29 Netia SA Low Poland 34 34.00 58.00 0 0 75 70 47.90
30 Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC High Nigeria 61 61.00 37.00 50 0 50 40 46.10
31 Oriental Weavers High Egypt 64 46.00 15.67 50 0 75 80 46.02
32 Thai Airways International PCL Moderate Thailand 47 27.00 58.00 100 100 100 10 45.95
33 Suning Universal Co Ltd Moderate China 54 54.00 21.67 0 0 75 70 45.82
34 Shin Nippon Air Technologies Co Ltd Very low Japan 19 40.00 55.00 0 0 75 50 45.25
35 Berger Paints Bangladesh Ltd High Bangladesh 66 66.00 0.00 0 0 100 60 45.10
36 Ono Pharmaceutical Co Ltd Very low Japan 19 44.33 49.00 0 100 100 10 44.77
37 Enel Americas SA Low Chile 29 45.67 85.00 0 0 75 0 44.73
38 Sonoco Products Co Very low United States 20 63.33 70.00 0 0 50 0 44.67
39 Elnusa Tbk PT Moderate Indonesia 44 44.00 67.00 100 0 75 0 44.65
40 Fu Shou Yuan International Group LtdModerate China 54 36.50 28.00 0 0 100 70 43.78
41 Cosco Capital Inc Moderate Philippines 51 51.00 43.00 0 0 50 50 43.60
42 Access Bank PLC High Nigeria 61 69.00 32.50 0 0 50 30 43.28
43 Sanyo Electric Railway Co Ltd Very low Japan 19 19.00 73.00 0 0 0 90 42.90
43 Polenergia SA Low Poland 34 34.00 46.00 50 0 50 60 42.90
45 Forest Water Environment Engineering Co LtdVery low Taiwan 19 29.33 46.00 0 0 50 80 42.77
46 OVS SpA Low Italy 31 49.67 73.00 0 0 50 10 42.63
47 Exel Industries Low France 24 40.67 76.00 0 0 50 20 42.23
48 Via Varejo SA Moderate Brazil 47 47.00 49.00 0 0 75 30 42.20
49 Banco BPM SpA Low Italy 31 19.67 82.00 0 0 100 20 41.38
50 AVI Ltd Moderate South Africa 41 53.67 52.00 50 0 50 10 41.28
51 Ateam Inc Very low Japan 19 38.50 21.67 0 0 75 70 40.39
52 Kellogg Co Very low United States 20 79.67 25.00 0 0 0 30 40.13
53 Iren SpA Low Italy 31 45.00 70.00 50 0 0 20 39.75
54 Minapharm Pharmaceuticals High Egypt 64 39.00 31.00 0 0 0 90 39.40
55 Sunac China Holdings Ltd Moderate China 54 36.50 32.50 0 0 100 40 38.90
56 Azul SA Moderate Brazil 47 31.33 49.00 0 0 75 40 38.72
57 Ryvu Therapeutics SA Low Poland 34 24.00 28.00 0 0 50 90 38.40
57 Telefonica Brasil SA Moderate Brazil 47 29.00 55.00 0 100 75 10 38.40
59 Jamco Corp Very low Japan 19 30.00 67.00 0 0 0 50 37.25
60 Antares Vision SpA Low Italy 31 48.67 39.67 0 0 0 50 36.95
61 Rapid7 Inc Very low United States 20 23.33 55.00 0 0 50 50 36.92
62 COIMA RES SpA Low Italy 31 25.00 68.50 100 0 0 30 36.88
63 Shoucheng Holdings Ltd Moderate China 54 41.00 49.00 50 0 75 0 36.60
64 Maruwa Unyu Kikan Co Ltd Very low Japan 19 19.00 49.00 0 0 0 80 34.90
65 Embotelladora Andina SA Low Chile 29 47.67 49.00 0 0 50 0 33.93
66 Ram-On Investments & Holdings 1999 LtdLow Israel 31 35.00 12.67 50 0 0 80 33.92
67 Alior Bank SA Low Poland 34 34.00 25.00 0 0 75 40 33.65
68 Recordati SpA Low Italy 31 51.67 40.00 0 0 50 0 33.08
69 Syneos Health Inc Very low United States 20 34.33 40.00 0 0 50 30 33.02
70 Gildan Activewear Inc Very low Canada 15 38.67 21.67 50 0 100 0 31.45
71 East West Bancorp Inc Very low United States 20 37.00 37.00 0 0 50 20 31.20
72 Genfit Low France 24 22.00 41.50 0 0 50 40 31.08
73 GTPL Hathway Ltd Moderate India 45 45.00 24.67 0 0 50 20 30.92
74 Tingyi Cayman Islands Holding Corp Very low Hong Kong 19 36.50 25.00 0 0 75 10 28.53
75 Guinness Nigeria PLC High Nigeria 61 61.00 0.00 0 0 50 10 28.35
76 Wallix Group Low France 24 22.67 14.00 0 0 50 50 26.43
77 Replimune Group Inc Very low United States 20 17.00 28.00 0 0 50 40 25.95
78 Borosil Glass Works Ltd Moderate India 45 39.00 5.00 0 0 50 30 25.90
79 Kajaria Ceramics Ltd Moderate India 45 37.33 14.00 0 0 50 20 25.57
80 PolyNovo Ltd Very low Australia 15 14.33 31.00 0 0 50 10 19.77
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Appendix M: SIC code mapping 
 
  Category Description 3-Digit SIC Code Ind. Code Industry 
A Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing       
  Cash Grains 011 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Field Crops, Except Cash Grains 013 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Vegetables & Melons 016 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Fruits and Tree Nuts 017 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Horticultural Specialties 018 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  General Farms, Primarily Crops 019 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Livestock, Except Dairy And Poultry 021 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Dairy Farms 024 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Poultry And Eggs 025 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Animal Specialties 027 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  General Farms, Primarily Livestock And Animal 029 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Soil Preparation Services 071 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Crop Services 072 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Veterinary Services 074 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Farm Labor And Management Services 076 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Landscape And Horticultural Services 078 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Timber Tracts 081 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Forest Nurseries And Gathering Of Forest 083 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Forestry Services 085 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Commercial Fishing 091 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Fish Hatcheries And Preserves 092 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Hunting And Trapping, And Game Propagation 097 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
B Mining       
  Iron ores 101 A Extraction 
  Copper ores 102 A Extraction 
  Lead and zinc ores 103 A Extraction 
  Gold and silver ores 104 A Extraction 
  Metal mining services 108 A Extraction 
  Miscellaneous metal ores 109 A Extraction 
  Bituminous coal and lignite mining 122 A Extraction 
  Anthracite mining 123 A Extraction 
  Coal mining services 124 A Extraction 
  Crude petroleum and natural gas 131 A Extraction 
  Natural gas liquids 132 A Extraction 
  Oil and gas field services 138 A Extraction 
  Dimension stone 141 A Extraction 
  Crushed and broken stone, including riprap 142 A Extraction 
  Sand and gravel 144 A Extraction 
  Clay, ceramic, and refractory minerals 145 A Extraction 
  Chemical and fertilizer mineral mining 147 A Extraction 
  Nonmetallic minerals services, except fuels 148 A Extraction 
  Miscellaneous nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 149 A Extraction 
C Construction industries       
  General contractors--residential buildings 152 C Construction 
  Operative builders 153 C Construction 
  General building contractors--nonresidential buildings 154 C Construction 
  
Highway and street construction contractors, except 
elevated highways 161 C Construction 
  
Heavy construction, except highway and street 
construction 162 C Construction 
  
Plumbing, heating, and air-conditioning special trade 
contractors 171 C Construction 
  Painting and paper hanging special trade contractors 172 C Construction 
  Electrical work special trade contractors 173 C Construction 
  
Masonry, stone work, tile setting, and plastering special 
trade contractors 174 C Construction 
  Carpentry and floor work special trade contractors 175 C Construction 
  
Roofing, siding, and sheet metal work special trade 
contractors 176 C Construction 
  Concrete work special trade contractors 177 C Construction 
  Water well drilling special trade contractors 178 C Construction 
  Miscellaneous special trade contractors 179 C Construction 
D Manufacturing       
  Meat products 201 F Manufacturing 
  Dairy products 202 F Manufacturing 
  Preserved fruits and vegetables 203 F Manufacturing 
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  Grain mill products 204 F Manufacturing 
  Bakery products 205 F Manufacturing 
  Sugar and confectionery products 206 F Manufacturing 
  Fats and oils 207 F Manufacturing 
  Beverages 208 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous food and kindred products 209 F Manufacturing 
  Cigarettes 211 F Manufacturing 
  Cigars 212 F Manufacturing 
  Chewing and smoking tobacco 213 F Manufacturing 
  Tobacco stemming and redrying 214 F Manufacturing 
  Broadwoven fabric mills, cotton 221 F Manufacturing 
  Broadwoven fabric mills, manmade fiber and silk 222 F Manufacturing 
  Broadwoven fabric mills, wool 223 F Manufacturing 
  Narrow fabric mills 224 F Manufacturing 
  Knitting mills 225 F Manufacturing 
  Textile finishing, except wool 226 F Manufacturing 
  Carpets and rugs 227 F Manufacturing 
  Yarn and thread mills 228 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous textile goods 229 F Manufacturing 
  Men's and boys' suits and coats 231 F Manufacturing 
  Men's and boys' furnishings 232 F Manufacturing 
  Women's and children's outerwear 233 F Manufacturing 
  Women's and children's undergarments 234 F Manufacturing 
  Hats, caps, and millinery 235 F Manufacturing 
  Girls' and children's outerwear 236 F Manufacturing 
  Fur goods 237 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous apparel and accessories 238 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous fabricated textile products 239 F Manufacturing 
  Logging 241 J Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
  Sawmills and planing mills 242 F Manufacturing 
  Millwork, plywood, and structural members 243 F Manufacturing 
  Wood containers 244 F Manufacturing 
  Wood buildings and mobile homes 245 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous wood products 249 F Manufacturing 
  Household furniture 251 F Manufacturing 
  Office furniture 252 F Manufacturing 
  Public building and related furniture 253 F Manufacturing 
  Partitions and fixtures 254 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous furniture and fixtures 259 F Manufacturing 
  Pulp mills 261 F Manufacturing 
  Paper mills 262 F Manufacturing 
  Paperboard mills 263 F Manufacturing 
  Paperboard containers and boxes 265 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous converted paper products 267 F Manufacturing 
  Newspapers 271 F Manufacturing 
  Periodicals 272 F Manufacturing 
  Books 273 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous publishing 274 F Manufacturing 
  Commercial printing 275 F Manufacturing 
  Manifold business forms 276 F Manufacturing 
  Greeting cards 277 F Manufacturing 
  Blankbooks and bookbinding 278 F Manufacturing 
  Printing trade services 279 F Manufacturing 
  Industrial inorganic chemicals 281 F Manufacturing 
  Plastics materials and synthetics 282 F Manufacturing 
  Drugs 283 B Human health 
  Soaps, cleaners, and toilet goods 284 F Manufacturing 
  Paints and allied products 285 F Manufacturing 
  Industrial organic chemicals 286 F Manufacturing 
  Agricultural chemicals 287 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous chemical products 289 F Manufacturing 
  Petroleum refining 291 A Extraction 
  Asphalt paving and roofing materials 295 A Extraction 
  Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 299 A Extraction 
  Tires and inner tubes 301 F Manufacturing 
  Rubber and plastics footwear 302 F Manufacturing 
  Hose and belting and gaskets and packing 305 F Manufacturing 
  Fabricated rubber products, n.e.c. 306 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c. 308 F Manufacturing 
  Leather tanning and finishing 311 F Manufacturing 
  Footwear cut stock 313 F Manufacturing 
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  Footwear, except rubber 314 F Manufacturing 
  Leather gloves and mittens 315 F Manufacturing 
  Luggage 316 F Manufacturing 
  Handbags and personal leather goods 317 F Manufacturing 
  Leather goods, n.e.c. 319 F Manufacturing 
  Flat glass 321 F Manufacturing 
  Glass and glassware, pressed or blown 322 F Manufacturing 
  Products of purchased glass 323 F Manufacturing 
  Cement, hydraulic 324 F Manufacturing 
  Structural clay products 325 F Manufacturing 
  Pottery and related products 326 F Manufacturing 
  Concrete, gypsum, and plaster products 327 F Manufacturing 
  Cut stone and stone products 328 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral products 329 F Manufacturing 
  Blast furnace and basic steel products 331 F Manufacturing 
  Iron and steel foundries 332 F Manufacturing 
  Primary nonferrous metals 333 F Manufacturing 
  Secondary nonferrous metals 334 F Manufacturing 
  Nonferrous rolling and drawing 335 F Manufacturing 
  Nonferrous foundries (castings) 336 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous primary metal products 339 F Manufacturing 
  Metal cans and shipping containers 341 F Manufacturing 
  Cutlery, handtools, and hardware 342 F Manufacturing 
  Plumbing and heating, except electric 343 F Manufacturing 
  Fabricated structural metal products 344 F Manufacturing 
  Screw machine products, bolts, etc. 345 F Manufacturing 
  Metal forgings and stampings 346 F Manufacturing 
  Metal services, n.e.c. 347 F Manufacturing 
  Ordnance and accessories 348 D Defense 
  Miscellaneous fabricated metal products 349 F Manufacturing 
  Engines and turbines 351 F Manufacturing 
  Farm and garden machinery 352 F Manufacturing 
  Construction and related machinery 353 C Construction 
  Metalworking machinery 354 F Manufacturing 
  Special industry machinery 355 F Manufacturing 
  
General industrial machinery, including military 
machinery 356 D Defense 
  Computer and office equipment 357 F Manufacturing 
  Refrigeration and service machinery 358 F Manufacturing 
  Industrial machinery, n.e.c. 359 F Manufacturing 
  Electric distribution equipment 361 F Manufacturing 
  
Electrical industrial apparatus, including Electrical 
defense components 362 D Defense 
  Household appliances 363 F Manufacturing 
  Electric lighting and wiring equipment 364 F Manufacturing 
  Household audio and video equipment 365 F Manufacturing 
  Communications equipment 366 F Manufacturing 
  Electronic components and accessories 367 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous electrical equipment and supplies 369 F Manufacturing 
  Motor vehicles and equipment 371 F Manufacturing 
  Aircraft and parts 372 F Manufacturing 
  Ship and boat building and repairing 373 F Manufacturing 
  Railroad equipment 374 F Manufacturing 
  Motorcycles, bicycles, and parts 375 F Manufacturing 
  Guided missiles, space vehicles, parts 376 D Defense 
  Miscellaneous transportation equipment 379 F Manufacturing 
  Search and navigation equipment 381 F Manufacturing 
  Measuring and controlling devices 382 F Manufacturing 
  Medical instruments and supplies 384 B Human health 
  Ophthalmic goods 385 B Human health 
  Photographic equipment and supplies 386 F Manufacturing 
  Watches, clocks, watchcases, and parts 387 F Manufacturing 
  Jewelry, silverware, and plated ware 391 F Manufacturing 
  Musical instruments 393 F Manufacturing 
  Toys and sporting goods 394 F Manufacturing 
  Pens, pencils, office, and art supplies 395 F Manufacturing 
  Costume jewelry and notions 396 F Manufacturing 
  Miscellaneous manufactures 399 F Manufacturing 
E Transportation, communications, and utilities        
  Railroad Transportation 401 G Transportation 
  Local and suburban passenger transportation 411 L Service Industries 
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  Taxi service 412 L Service Industries 
  Interurban and rural bus transportation 413 L Service Industries 
  Charter bus service 414 L Service Industries 
  School bus service 415 L Service Industries 
  Bus terminal and service facilities 417 L Service Industries 
  Trucking and courier services, except air 421 G Transportation 
  Public warehousing and storage 422 G Transportation 
  Trucking terminal facilities 423 G Transportation 
  Deep sea freight transportation 441 G Transportation 
  Coastal and intercoastal freight transportation 442 G Transportation 
  
Great Lakes - St. Lawrence Seaway freight 
transportation 443 G Transportation 
  Inland waterways freight transportation 444 G Transportation 
  Water transportation of passengers 448 G Transportation 
  Services incidental to water transportation 449 G Transportation 
  Scheduled air transportation and air courier services  451 G Transportation 
  Nonscheduled air transportation 452 G Transportation 
  Airport terminal services 458 G Transportation 
  Pipelines, except natural gas 461 G Transportation 
  Arrangement of passenger transportation 472 G Transportation 
  Freight shipping services 473 G Transportation 
  Railroad car rental 474 G Transportation 
  Miscellaneous services incidental to transportation 478 G Transportation 
  Telephone 481 E Telecommunication 
  Telegraph communications 482 E Telecommunication 
  Radio and television broadcasting 483 E Telecommunication 
  Cable and other pay television broadcasting 484 E Telecommunication 
  Communication services, not elsewhere classified 489 E Telecommunication 
  Electric services 491 H Utilities 
  Gas production and distribution 492 H Utilities 
  Combination utility services 493 H Utilities 
  Water supply 494 H Utilities 
  Sanitary services 495 H Utilities 
  Steam and air-conditioning supply 496 H Utilities 
  Irrigation systems 497 H Utilities 
F Wholesale trade       
  Motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts and supplies 501 K Wholesale and retail 
  Furniture and home furnishings 502 K Wholesale and retail 
  Lumber and other construction materials 503 K Wholesale and retail 
  Professional and commercial equipment and supplies 504 K Wholesale and retail 
  Metals and minerals, except petroleum 505 K Wholesale and retail 
  Electrical goods 506 K Wholesale and retail 
  
Hardware and plumbing and heating equipment and 
supplies 507 K Wholesale and retail 
  Machinery, equipment, and supplies 508 K Wholesale and retail 
  Miscellaneous durable goods 509 K Wholesale and retail 
  Paper and paper products 511 K Wholesale and retail 
  Drugs, drug proprietaries, and druggists' sundries 512 K Wholesale and retail 
  Apparel, piece goods, and notions 513 K Wholesale and retail 
  Groceries and related products 514 K Wholesale and retail 
  Farm-product raw materials 515 K Wholesale and retail 
  Chemicals and allied products 516 K Wholesale and retail 
  Petroleum and petroleum products 517 A Extraction 
  Beer, wine, and distilled alcoholic beverages 518 K Wholesale and retail 
  Miscellaneous nondurable goods 519 K Wholesale and retail 
G Retail trade       
  Lumber and other building materials dealers 521 K Wholesale and retail 
  Paint, glass, and wallpaper stores 523 K Wholesale and retail 
  Hardware stores 525 K Wholesale and retail 
  Retail nurseries, lawn and garden supply stores 526 K Wholesale and retail 
  Mobile home dealers 527 K Wholesale and retail 
  Department stores (excluding leased departments)  531 K Wholesale and retail 
  Variety stores 533 K Wholesale and retail 
  Miscellaneous general merchandise stores 539 K Wholesale and retail 
  Grocery stores 541 K Wholesale and retail 
  
Meat and fish (seafood) markets, including freezer 
provisioners 542 K Wholesale and retail 
  Fruit and vegetable markets 543 K Wholesale and retail 
  Candy, nut, and confectionery stores 544 K Wholesale and retail 
  Dairy products stores 545 K Wholesale and retail 
  Retail bakeries 546 K Wholesale and retail 
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  Miscellaneous food stores 549 K Wholesale and retail 
  Motor vehicle dealers (new and used) 551 K Wholesale and retail 
  Motor vehicle dealers (used only) 552 K Wholesale and retail 
  Auto and home supply stores 553 K Wholesale and retail 
  Gasoline service stations 554 K Wholesale and retail 
  Boat dealers 555 K Wholesale and retail 
  Recreational vehicle dealers 556 K Wholesale and retail 
  Motorcycle dealers 557 K Wholesale and retail 
  Automotive dealers, not elsewhere classified 559 K Wholesale and retail 
  Men's and boys' clothing and accessory stores 561 K Wholesale and retail 
  Women's clothing stores 562 K Wholesale and retail 
  Women's accessory and specialty stores 563 K Wholesale and retail 
  Children's and infants' wear stores 564 K Wholesale and retail 
  Family clothing stores 565 K Wholesale and retail 
  Shoe stores 566 K Wholesale and retail 
  Miscellaneous apparel and accessory stores 569 K Wholesale and retail 
  Home furniture and furnishings stores 571 K Wholesale and retail 
  Household appliance stores 572 K Wholesale and retail 
  
Radio, television, consumer electronics, and music 
stores 573 K Wholesale and retail 
  Eating and drinking places 581 K Wholesale and retail 
  Drug stores and proprietary stores 591 K Wholesale and retail 
  Liquor stores 592 K Wholesale and retail 
  Used merchandise stores 593 K Wholesale and retail 
  Miscellaneous shopping goods stores 594 K Wholesale and retail 
  Nonstore retailers 596 K Wholesale and retail 
  Fuel dealers 598 A Extraction 
  Retail stores, not elsewhere classified 599 K Wholesale and retail 
H Financial, insurance, and real estate industries       
  Central reserve depository institutions 601 I Financial services 
  Commercial banks 602 I Financial services 
  Savings institutions 603 I Financial services 
  Credit unions 606 I Financial services 
  
Foreign banking and branches and agencies of foreign 
banks 608 I Financial services 
  Functions related to depository banking 609 I Financial services 
  Federal & federally-sponsored credit agencies 611 I Financial services 
  Personal credit institutions 614 I Financial services 
  Business credit institutions 615 I Financial services 
  Mortgage bankers and brokers 616 I Financial services 
  Security brokers, dealers, and flotation companies 621 I Financial services 
  Commodity contracts brokers and dealers 622 I Financial services 
  Security and commodity exchanges 623 I Financial services 
  
Services allied with the exchange of securities or 
commodities 628 I Financial services 
  Life insurance 631 I Financial services 
  Accident and health insurance and medical service plans 632 I Financial services 
  Fire, marine, and casualty insurance 633 I Financial services 
  Surety insurance 635 I Financial services 
  Title insurance 636 I Financial services 
  Pension, health, and welfare funds 637 I Financial services 
  Insurance carriers, n.e.c. 639 I Financial services 
  Insurance agents, brokers, and services 641 I Financial services 
  Real estate operators (except developers) and lessors 651 I Financial services 
  Real estate agents and managers 653 I Financial services 
  Title abstract offices 654 I Financial services 
  Land subdividers and developers 655 I Financial services 
  Holding offices 671 I Financial services 
  Investment offices 672 I Financial services 
  Trusts 673 I Financial services 
  Miscellaneous investing 679 I Financial services 
I Service industries       
  Hotels & motels 701 L Service Industries 
  Rooming & boarding houses 702 L Service Industries 
  Camps and recreational vehicle parks 703 L Service Industries 
  Power laundries, family & commercial 721 L Service Industries 
  Photographic studios, portrait 722 L Service Industries 
  Beauty shops 723 L Service Industries 
  Barber shops 724 L Service Industries 
  Shoe repair shops & shoeshine parlors 725 L Service Industries 
  Funeral service & crematories 726 L Service Industries 
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  Miscellaneous personal services 729 L Service Industries 
  Advertising Services 731 L Service Industries 
  Consumer Credit Reporting / Mercantile Services 732 L Service Industries 
  Mailing, Reproduction & Commerical Art Services 733 L Service Industries 
  Services to Dwellings & Other Buildings 734 L Service Industries 
  
Miscellaneous Equipment Rental & Leasing, incl. Oilfield 
& well drilling equipment rental & leasing 735 A Extraction 
  Personnel Supply Services 736 L Service Industries 
  Computer Programming and Data Processing 737 L Service Industries 
  Miscellaneous Business Services 738 L Service Industries 
  Automotive Rental And Leasing, Without Drivers 751 L Service Industries 
  Automobile parking 752 L Service Industries 
  Automotive repair shops 753 L Service Industries 
  Automotive Services, Except Repair 754 L Service Industries 
  Repair Services 762 L Service Industries 
  Electrical Repair Shops 762 L Service Industries 
  Watch, clock, & jewelry repair 763 L Service Industries 
  Reupholstery & furniture repair 764 L Service Industries 
  Miscellaneous Repair Shops And Related Services 769 L Service Industries 
  Motion Picture Services 762 L Service Industries 
  Motion Picture Production And Allied Services 781 L Service Industries 
  Motion Picture Distribution And Allied Services 782 L Service Industries 
  Motion picture theaters  783 L Service Industries 
  Video tape rental 784 L Service Industries 
  Dance studios, schools, and halls 791 L Service Industries 
  
Theatrical producers (except motion picture) bands, 
orchestras, and entertainers 792 L Service Industries 
  Bowling centers 793 L Service Industries 
  Commercial sports 794 L Service Industries 
  Miscellaneous amusement and recreation services 799 L Service Industries 
  Offices and clinics of doctors of medicine  801 B Human health 
  Offices and clinics of dentists  802 B Human health 
  Offices & clinics of doctors of osteopathy 803 B Human health 
  Offices And Clinics Of Other Health Practitioners 804 B Human health 
  Nursing and personal care facilities 805 B Human health 
  Hospitals 806 B Human health 
  Medical & Dental laboratories 807 B Human health 
  Home health care services 808 B Human health 
  
Miscellaneous health and allied services, not elsewhere 
classified 809 B Human health 
  Legal services 811 L Service Industries 
  Elementary & Secondary Schools 821 L Service Industries 
  Colleges, Universities, Professional Schools 822 L Service Industries 
  Libraries  823 L Service Industries 
  Vocational schools 824 L Service Industries 
  
Schools and educational services, not elsewhere 
classified 829 L Service Industries 
  Individual and family social services 832 L Service Industries 
  Job training and vocational rehabilitation services 833 L Service Industries 
  Child daycare services 835 L Service Industries 
  Residential care 836 L Service Industries 
  Social services, not elsewhere classified  839 L Service Industries 
  Museums and art galleries 841 L Service Industries 
  Arboreta and botanical or zoological gardens 842 L Service Industries 
  Business Associations 861 L Service Industries 
  Professional Membership Organizations 862 L Service Industries 
  Labor Unions And Similar Labor Organizations 863 L Service Industries 
  Civic, Social, And Fraternal Associations 864 L Service Industries 
  Political Organizations 865 L Service Industries 
  Religious Organizations 866 L Service Industries 
  Membership organizations, not elsewhere classified 869 L Service Industries 
  Engineering, Architectural, Surveying Service 871 L Service Industries 
  Accounting, auditing, & bookkeeping services 872 L Service Industries 
  
Research, development, and testing services (except 
noncommercial research organizations) 873 L Service Industries 
  Management and public relations services 874 L Service Industries 
  Private Households 881 L Service Industries 
  Miscellaneous Services, Not Classified Elsewhere 899 L Service Industries 
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Appendix N: R script and data sets 
The complete R script, as well as the underlying datasets used for the analyses can be accessed 
at: https://github.com/gsterbinszky/TRACE. The script contains the data preparation, random 
sampling, analysis, and visualization step taken to conduct our analysis.  
 
